EXHIBIT 1 (Hearing Transcript)



1	SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT - OGDEN DISTRICT COURT
2	WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
3	
4	MOLLY J. MULLIGAN, et al.,) Case No. 240908957
5	Plaintiffs,) TRANSCRIPT OF:
6	v.) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
7	ALUM ROCK RIVERSIDE LLC, et) al,
9	Defendants.)
10	
11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE NOEL S. HYDE
12	OGDEN DISTRICT COURT
13	2525 GRANT AVENUE COURTROOM #3C
14	OGDEN, UTAH 84401
15	JANUARY 14, 2025
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19	STATE OF UTAH COUNTY OF WEBER SS. HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF THE
20	ORIGINAL ON FILE IN MY OFFICE. DATED THIS 12 Th DAY OF Travel 20 25
21	CLERK OF THE COURT BY MONCLON MOSTON DEPUTY
22	OCDEN STREET
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2 of 96

1	INDEX	
2	WITNESS	PAGE
3	BLAKE HEINER	
4	Direct Examination By Mr. Tilt Cross Examination By Mr. Johnson	14 37
5	Mulligan	-
6	EXHIBITS	
7	EXHIBIT	PAGE
9	Exhibit 1, Tab 10 Exhibit 1, Tab 1 Exhibit 1, Tab 5 Exhibit 1, Tab 4 Exhibit 1, Tab 8	16 17 19 19 21
	Exhibit 1, Tab 11	22
11	Exhibit 1, Tab 12 Exhibit 1, Tab 6	23 24
12	Exhibit 1, Tab 7 Exhibit 1, Tab 9	25 27
13	Exhibit 1, Tab 2 Exhibit 1, Tab 3	28 28
14	Exhibit 1, Tabs 13, 14, 15	47
15		
16		
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January 14, 2025

PROCEEDINGS

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THE COURT: All right. We are on the record in Mulligan versus Alum Rock. Cases 240908957.

Counsel, please note your appearances.

MR. TILT: Bradley Tilt, Your Honor, for the

8 | Mulligans.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. JOHNSON: Ben Johnson for Alum Rock Riverside.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

This is the time set to consider a request for a preliminary injunction. A temporary restraining order previously issued based upon the request of the plaintiffs in this case. And I will hear the argument on the preliminary injunction request.

MR. TILT: Your Honor, may I approach the bench?

THE COURT: Please. Thank you.

MR. TILT: I provided the Court a binder of the exhibits that I anticipate referencing today. I provided a set to opposing counsel as well. And I do have one witness to testify on a couple of issues that --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. TILT: -- if that is necessary today.

THE COURT: Do you wish to make an opening before

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we get started, counsel?

MR. TILT: A brief. Yes.

THE COURT: Please.

MR. TILT: First of all, as a matter of because keeping on those exhibits, all of them, except for 8 and I believe, are certified copies. So I would ask that we can use Rule 902 regarding self-authentication with regard to those items.

THE COURT: All right. And we can deal with those when the documents are actually offered. And I'll simply reserve ruling on questions of that nature until the actual matters are before me.

MR. TILT: Sure. Okay.

What brings us here today, Your Honor, on an expedited hearing basis, is Alum Rock's circumvention of this Court's ruling in the separated but related Single Box case from November 26 of 2024. Case number 210904774.

In that case, Your Honor ruled at the end of a hearing on a motion for supplemental pleadings to combine Alum Rock as a party into the Single Box case. Your Honor ruled that the Mulligans could supplement their complaint, could bring Alum Rock into that case, and could litigate whether Alum Rock's judgment lien and writ of execution may not -- and ruled that the judgment lien claimed by Alum Rock and its writ of execution, that is the subject of the foreclosure sale that

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we're here about today, quote, "May not extend to the interest of a co-settlor in the property."

Document 24-1

And the Court at that point -- and I'm quoting from the Court's oral ruling. We obtained a written transcript from that. And the Court at that point referenced Footnote 4 from the Supreme Court's ruling in -- or the foot -- Footnote 7 from the Supreme Court's ruling in the Alum Rock case in this matter.

The -- the Court went on to say at the end of that hearing, on page 53 of the transcript--and this is part of the materials that have been filed with the court as well--quote, "Therefore, the judgment lien is a lien against the interest originating from Brett Del Valle, not necessarily against anyone else. And the execution, therefore, is also directed to that same limitation," end quote.

Mr. Johnson, who is Alum Rock's counsel here today, was present during that hearing. He had filed a motion to intervene asking to be -- for his client and him to be able to participate in that proceeding. He asked for a point of clarification with regard to the Court's ruling during that hearing. He ordered an audio transcript on December 4th of 2024 of that ruling.

The Mulligans ordered a written transcript of the Court's ruling, because Your Honor may recall it was very detailed and complicated, and -- in order to reduce that to an

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_____ I wanted to have a written transcript so I could get it right.

Alum Rock, however -- and that -- the written transcript was filed with the court on December 9th of 2024.

On December 18 of 2024, however, Alum Rock took it upon itself to unilaterally proceed to re-notice another foreclosure sale under its same old writ, without any clarification with regard to the scope of what was being foreclosed or not foreclosed.

Counsel has attacked myself in the briefing for this matter here, claiming that we are judge shopping and -and trying to get a better result. It's actually the other way around. It's Alum Rock who has decided they didn't like that they were going to have to prove up the -- the contribution interest of Brett to the property, that was the full extent of the lien, judgment lien, and of the writ.

And we had no choice, the Mulligans, but to file a new action. Because there was no way to get an order of that detail reduced to writing, get Alum Rock brought in, and then file a motion in -- in the other case, the Single Box case, to get this sale restrained. We therefore had no choice but to file the new case, which is this case here today, to file a motion for injunctive relief.

So that is the background that brings us to the -to the proceedings today.

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And I submit, Your Honor, that the -- it's The stant to note that we are not, in this case, the Mulligans are not attacking the writ itself. We are not attacking. understand the Supreme Court has ruled what it ruled, and the writ is what it is. But as Your Honor noted, Footnote 7 said, "But we don't know what that writ attaches to, what that judgment attaches to." And those are the proceedings that are the subject of this case.

Counsel has argued that we have a claim preclusion problem with regard to this case. That's flatly false, however. Because as the Supreme Court also very firmly excoriated, myself frankly, in the written opinion from the Alum Rock case, the Alum Rock case was not an action with regard to real property. The Alum Rock case, the Supreme Court very clearly held, was a writ proceeding, and it was not an action involving real property.

Therefore, we were limited in the prior case to filing anything attacking the writ, which is what we did. And attacking whether the judgment attached, which we did. Could it attach to the property at all? Statutory compliance with the judgment lien statue.

The claims in this case, however, are real property They are an action with regard to real property under the venue statute which provides exclusive jurisdiction to this court, and not to Judge Mow in the Third District Court.

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property is located in Weber County. So this is the appropriate forum for this action that is on different and separate issues.

We submit that we have provided in the briefing material that will -- that does, in fact, show that we have a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits, to show that the governing statute, 75-7-505(1), shows that the lien interest or -- or writ of execution interest -- that Alum Rock could potentially attach to is only that of the -- to the extent of the contribution of their judgment debtor, Brett Del Valle personally, to the property that was owned and conveyed to the Mulligans by his trust, and not by him personally. 75-7-505(1) says they can only attach to Brett's interest, his interest as settlor. Because there are two settlors of the trust, him and his wife.

We submit that there's also a substantial likelihood of the Mulligans prevailing on their equitable subrogation claim, because there is no question that they paid off liens that were already of record, and prior to the judgment lien claimed by Alum Rock. And therefore they are, under the equitable subrogation doctrine, placed into the shoes of those judgment creditors, i.e. they are ahead of, and not subject to any lien by Alum Rock.

And that is an equitable doctrine to prevent, not only unjust enrichment of Alum Rock by being elevated to a

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priority position by accident, but also to prevent a loss of the real property by the Mulligans.

Utah law is clear and -- and has recognized that, "Real property has always been regarded as unique, because no two parcels are exactly alike," end quote. That's the Utah Department of Transportation versus Jones case cited in the briefing at 694 P.2d page -- 1031, page 1036.

So the Mulligans are here to protect their real property interest. They are entitled, as this Court has already ruled, to assert the -- the contribution issue under 75-7-505(1). And we submit that they -- that the preliminary injunction ought to issue until this Court can more fully and in a -- a more traditional form litigate the full merits of the underlying claims in this case.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

MR. JOHNSON: Once again, my apologies for not standing. Counsel had handed me a binder and I didn't hear the clerk's direction, and I was just distracted. So once again, my apologies.

We -- we think ultimately Alum Rock, that this is -- this court is simply the wrong court to hear these issues. There is an open and pending matter in the Third District Court where the -- this California -- California judgment was originally domesticated in, and where the writ was issued out of. There is a pending matter right now. And we think,

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A little background. Initially, when the writ was issued, the -- the respondents, the Mulligans, had an opportunity at that point in time to present any legal arguments under the sun as to why my client, Alum Rock, should not be able to proceed with its writ of execution.

At that time, the Mulligans raised a number of legal arguments why the writ of execution should not be allowed to proceed, including that the property -- that there was a distinction between the judgment that my client held, which was against Brett Del Valle individually, and the fact that the property was held by Brett Del Valle as trustee.

They argued you have a judgment against Brett Del Valle, the property's held in trust, you can't -- you can't proceed on your writ of execution because there's a distinction between Brett Del Valle individually and Brett Dal Valle as trustee. They made that argument.

They made arguments that the -- the judgment lien was not properly recorded. It wasn't properly -- that the statutes weren't followed.

All the arguments that they're making today could have been raised then. That the Mulligans are BFPs. That they didn't have constructive notice. That they are entitled to equitable subordination or equitable subrogation. All the

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Third District Court. And frankly, they should be.

And this gets to, I think, the biggest issues are today, are whether this Court is the proper forum for these issues. We cited in our brief to the principle of comity. And we found quite a bit of case law in the federal district court system, when you have one court hearing an issue and then another court gets involved in the same issue.

Here's what the federal courts have said. "Federal courts have long recognized that the principle of comity requires federal district courts, courts of (inaudible) jurisdiction and equal rank to exercise care to avoid interference with each other's affairs. When an injunction sought in one federal proceeding would interfere with another federal proceeding, considerations of comity require more than the usual measure of restraint. And such injunctions should be granted only in the most unusual of cases."

So what we have here is, the Mulligans asking the Second District Court to enjoin a validly issued writ of execution out of the Third District Court.

We think, at the end of the day, this Court should decline jurisdiction, recognize the principle of comity, and refer the Mulligans back to the Third District Court for them to raise the legal arguments they seem to think they have.

> THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. JOHNSON: Thank you.
                THE COURT: Thank you.
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                Reply? Well, those are openings. If there's
     evidence, counsel, that you wish to present, you can address
 4
 5
     that now.
                MR. TILT: Yes, I would like to present evidence,
 6
7
     Your Honor.
 8
                I don't mean to interrupt the Court, but are you
 9
     waiting for me or --
10
                THE COURT: Yep.
11
                MR. TILT: -- or am I waiting for you?
12
                THE COURT: Yeah.
13
                MR. TILT: Okay.
                THE COURT: If you intend to present evidence --
14
15
                MR. TILT: Okay.
16
                THE COURT: -- it is now your opportunity to do so.
17
                MR. TILT: I call Blake Heiner to the stand.
                THE COURT: Blake Heiner, please step forward and
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19
     be place under oath to testify.
20
                 (Witness sworn.)
                THE COURT: Please be seated.
21
22
                THE WITNESS: Thank you.
                MR. TILT: May I approach the witness, Your Honor?
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24
                THE COURT: You may.
25
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BLAKE HEINER 2 called as a witness herein, having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, was examined and testified as follows: 3 4 DIRECT EXAMINATION 5 BY MR. TILT: 6 7 Would you please state your full name for the 8 record? Blake T. Heiner. 9 10 And what do you do for a living? 11 I am general counsel -- vice president and general counsel for Metro National Title Company in -- based in Salt 12 13 Lake City. 14 Does Metro National Title have anything to do with 15 the real property that's at issue in this case purchased by 16 Molly Mulligan and John P. Mulligan? 17 Metro National Title issued the owner's policy of 18 title insurance to the Mulligans when they purchased the 19 property. Also acted as escrow closing agent for the 20 transaction. 21 Could you please turn to Exhibit 8 in that binder in front of you? Do you recognize that? Or I'm sorry. Ten. 22 23 Ten in the binder in front of you? 24 Okay. A 25 Do you recognize that document? Q

A Yes. What is that? That is the deed by which Del Valle -- I don't --3 I'm not sure the pronunciation. I've heard a couple of 4 different ones this morning. Del Valle and his wife, as 5 trustees of the Del Valle Family Trust, conveyed title to Molly 6 and John Mulligan. 7 In the transaction that Metro closed? 8 A Correct. MR. TILT: And Your Honor, I'd move for admission 10 11 of Exhibit 10 into evidence. 12 THE COURT: Any objection? 13 MR. JOHNSON: None. 14 THE COURT: Tab 10 in the binder, which has --15 Have you identified the exhibits separately, 16 counsel? 17 MR. TILT: Like a table of contents, you mean? 18 THE COURT: Well, no. The requirement for counsel in submitting exhibits is that the exhibits need to be marked 19 20 and identified. These do not appear to have been marked. what I'm going to do is have the binder marked as -- this is 21 plaintiff's exhibit. And this will be Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 22 23 And so the documents within the binder will be referred to by 24 their tabs. 25 MR. TILT: Okay.

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THE COURT: So that we don't have to take the time
     of now individually labeling and marking each of the documents.
 2
 3
     So I am going to require that the binder itself be marked.
                 Do you have something you can mark the binder with?
 4
                MR. TILT: I actually can mark each of the exhibits
 5
 6
     if you want. I (inaudible) stickers.
 7
                THE COURT: No. I don't -- I don't want to take
 8
     the time to --
 9
                MR. TILT: Okay.
10
                THE COURT: -- mark each of the exhibits.
11
                MR. TILT: Yeah.
12
                THE COURT: We'll simply mark the binder as
13
     Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. And if counsel will, as we go through
14
     the proceedings, just refer to the different documents by their
15
     tab number within Plaintiff's 1.
16
                MR. TILT: Sure.
17
                THE COURT: So if you'll just put an exhibit
     sticker on the front of the binder. That will be Plaintiff's
18
19
     1. And then if counsel will just follow the protocol of
20
     referring to the documents by their tab numbers within
21
     Plaintiff's 1.
22
                So Plaintiff's 1, Tab 10 is received.
23
                 (Exhibit 1, Tab 10 received.)
24
                THE COURT: You may proceed, counsel.
25
                               Would you turn to Exhibit 1 in the
            Q
                 (By Mr. Tilt)
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be provided to the Mulligans in the course of such a transaction? 2 3 Not generally, no. Do you know whether it was in this case? 4 I don't believe it was. To the best of my 5 A 6 knowledge, no copy was provided to the Mulligans. 7 Let's have you turn, please, to Exhibit 1, Tab 5. 8 A Okay. 9 Do you recognize that document? Q 10 A Yes. 11 0 What is that? That is a copy of a deed of trust by and between 12 A 13 Brett and Traci Del Valle as trustees of the Del Valle Family 14 Trust as trustors in favor of, let's see -- it doesn't identify 15 the beneficiary, interestingly enough, on that first page. But 16 anyway, in any event, it appears to be a security instrument 17 encumbering the property in question as security for the obligation identified in the deed of trust. 18 19 And I wonder if I could direct you to the top left 20 corner under where it says, "when recorded mail to." There's a 21 name of Emerald Bay there. Do you have any -- any knowledge as 22 you sit here today whether that's the beneficiary of that trust 23 deed? I think that's fair assumption. 24 25 MR. TILT: I move for admission of Exhibit 1, Tab 5

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into evidence.
                THE COURT: Any objection?
 3
                MR. JOHNSON: No objection.
                THE COURT: P-1, Tab 5 is received.
 4
 5
                 (Exhibit 1, Tab 5 received.)
 6
                 (By Mr. Tilt) Let's have you look at Exhibit 1,
 7
     Tab 4, please, in the binder. Do you recognize that document?
 8
                      That is another deed of trust by and between
     Brett and Traci Del Valle as trustees of the Del Valle Family
 9
     Trust as borrowers, and the lender being BOFI, B-O-F-I Federal
10
11
     Bank, out of California. Another trust deed that had been
12
     recorded against the property and encumbered it to secure an
13
     obligation of the Del Valle Trust to the lender.
14
                MR. TILT: Move for admission of Exhibit 1, Tab 4
15
     into evidence.
16
                THE COURT: Any objection?
17
                MR. JOHNSON: No objection.
18
                THE COURT: P-1, Tab 4 is received.
19
                 (Exhibit 1, Tab 4 received.)
20
                 (By Mr. Tilt) Let's have you turn please to
21
    Exhibit 8.
               Exhibit 1, Tab 8. And what is that?
22
                That is a copy of the posting summary, which
23
     contains the information concerning disbursements that were
24
    made by Metro National Title -- involved in the trans --
25
     transaction, the sale of the property from the Del Valle Family
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Trust to the Mulligans. And it and shows all the disbursements 2 that were made from that closing. 3 And there's a heading that says receipts. And then it says payor. And then it has the Mulligans' names listed 4 5 there. Can you tell me what that line item means? That means that the Mulligans delivered into escrow 6 7 the sum of \$1,775,896.73 to the amount needed to close the 8 transaction in question. 9 And then under the disbursements heading, and there 10 is a list of payees there. What does that portion of the 11 document show? 12 That shows all of the disbursements that were made 13 from that \$1,775,000 that the Mulligans deposited into escrow. 14 The first one there says Axos Bank. Do you see 15 that? 16 Yes. A 17 And the second one, then, says Emerald Bay Capital. 18 Do you see that? 19 A Yes. 20 It looks like the Axos Bank, the disbursement from 21 the Metro account to Axos Bank was \$712,000 and change. Is 22 that fair to say? 23 That is correct. 24 And the disbursement from the Metro funds in this 25 transaction to Emerald Bay was \$948,000 even. Is that correct?

Α Correct. Let's have you turn please to Exhibit 11. 2 Oh. Move for admission of Exhibit 8. 3 MR. TILT: THE COURT: Any --4 5 Exhibit 1, Tab 8 into evidence. MR. TILT: THE COURT: Any objection to Tab 8? 6 MR. JOHNSON: No objection. 8 THE COURT: Tab 8 is received. 9 (Exhibit 1, Tab 8 received.) (By Mr. Tilt) Okay. Let's now have you go, 10 11 please, to Exhibit 1, Tab 11. 12 I have that. A 13 Do recognize that document? 14 Yes. That --15 What is that? -- is a deed of reconveyance that references --16 that releases the deed of trust. And if I might take a quick 17 18 look back at the previous tabs, I can tell you which deed of 19 trust that is referring to. That is referring to the -- the 20 Emerald Bay Capital deed of trust. That document is signed as 21 part of the transaction pursuant to instructions and 22 authorization from Emerald Bay Capital directing Metro National 23 Title to reconvey that deed of trust. 24 Is that your signature on that? 25 A Yes.

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And when you say it refers to the Emerald Bay trust
            0
     deed, is that Exhibit 1, Tab 5 in the book?
                I believe that is correct. Let me take a quick
 3
 4
     look. Yes.
                And you can cross reference that by the entry
 5
     number?
 6
 7
                Yes.
            A
                3066407 is released by Exhibit 1, Tab 11. And that
 8
     3066407 is Exhibit 1, Tab 5?
 9
                That is correct.
10
            Α
11
                Let's have you look --
                MR. TILT: Move for admission of Exhibit 1, Tab 11
12
13
     into evidence.
                THE COURT: Any objection?
14
                MR. JOHNSON: No objection.
15
                 THE COURT: Tab 11 is received.
16
17
                 (Exhibit 1, Tab 11 received.)
                 (By Mr. Tilt) Let's have you go to Tab 12, please.
18
19
     Do you recognize that document?
                Yes, that is a deed of reconveyance. That refers
20
     to the deed of trust in Exhibit 1, Tab 5. Oh, no. Excuse me.
21
     Tab 4. Yes, referring to Tab 4.
22
23
                And that --
            0
24
                Cross referencing that via the entry number
25
     reconveying and releasing that deed of trust.
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MR. TILT: Move for admission of Exhibit 12 into
 1
 2
     evidence.
                THE COURT: Tab 12 of P-1, any objection?
 3
 4
                MR. JOHNSON: Excuse me. No objection.
 5
                THE COURT: Tab 12 is received.
                 (Exhibit 1, Tab 12 received.)
 6
 7
            0
                 (By Mr. Tilt) Let's have you turn to Exhibit 1,
 8
     Tab 6, please. Have you ever seen that document before?
 9
            A
                Yes.
                When is the first time you saw that document?
10
                 Probably at the time this -- this claim -- or
11
     throughout the process. At some point during the process of
12
     this claim and this litigation.
13
                So after the -- the closing to Mulligans. Is that
14
15
     fair to say?
                That's correct.
16
17
                Did -- did Metro Title conduct a search in
18
     connection with the Mulligan closing, of the court records in
19
     Weber County for any judgments against the Del Valle Family
20
     Trust?
                We searched the records of the county recorder with
21
22
     regard to judgments, and this judgment was not found.
                And in the -- in connection with searches for
23
     closing in a sale like the Mulligans', does Metro routinely
24
25
     search court records in the county, as well as county recorder
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23 of 96

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records?
                Not since the statute was changed that requires
 3
     that judgments be recorded with the county recorder. We do not
     check the -- check court records as a general rule.
 4
            0
                Okay. Let's have you look --
 5
                MR. TILT: Move for admission into evidence of Tab
 6
     -- Exhibit 1, Tab 6.
 7
                 THE COURT: Any objection to Tab 6?
 8
 9
                MR. JOHNSON: No objection.
10
                 THE COURT: Tab 6 is received.
                 (Exhibit 1, Tab 6 received.)
11
12
                 (By Mr. Tilt) And let's have you look at Exhibit
            0
13
     7. And I'll just represent to you -- or Exhibit 1, Tab 7.
14
     I'll just represent to you that's the same document as Tab 6,
15
     except for the Tab 7 document has a county recorder's stamp on
16
     it as well. Do you see that there, above the caption?
17
                Yes. That is correct.
                Okay. And it's -- it's your testimony that that
18
19
     judgment did not come up in any search of the records in
20
     connection with the sale of the property by the Del Valle
21
     Family Trust?
22
            A
                That is correct.
23
            0
                Do you know why?
24
                There are a couple of reasons. The primary one
25
    being that, although the judgment was recorded, it was not
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abstracted to this property, this particular parcel of
 1
 2
     property. Also, the abstract that appears in the recorder's
 3
     office does not identify Brett Del Valle as a judgment
 4
     creditor.
                What does that mean?
                 It means, if you look at the abstract in the Weber
 6
 7
     County Recorder's Office, it identifies Alum Rock as the
 8
     judgment creditor and PRP Investors Madison, et al., as
     judgment debtors.
 9
10
                 I see.
11
                 It does not name Brett Del Valle.
12
            0
                 Okay.
                 That name does not appear in the recorder's
13
14
     abstract for this judgment.
15
                 Does the name "the Del Valle Family Trust" appear
16
     in the abstract of that judgment?
17
            A
                 No.
                 MR. TILT: Move for admission into evidence of
18
19
     Exhibit 1, Tab 7.
20
                 THE COURT: Any objection?
21
                 MR. JOHNSON: No object --
22
                 THE COURT: Okay.
23
                 MR. JOHNSON: No objection.
                 THE COURT: Tab 7 of P-1 is received.
24
25
                 (Exhibit 1, Tab 7 received.)
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(By Mr. Tilt) Let's have you turn to Exhibit 1 0 2 1, Tab 9, please. Do you recognize that document? 3 Yes. This is a copy of the Weber County Recorder abstract of title with -- that relates to, excuse me, to this 4 5 particular parcel of property that was used -- well, let me take a look at it. Yes. This was in Metro National Title's 6 7 file as the abstract that was relied upon for purpose of searching the title in connection with the Del Valle 8 9 Trust/Mulligan transaction. MR. TILT: Move for admission of Exhibit 1, Tab 9 10 11 into evidence. 12 THE COURT: Any objection? 13 MR. JOHNSON: We do -- I do have an objection on 14 this document. This appears to be a printout from a website. 15 This isn't an official government record, as far as I'm aware 16 So I have an objection to the hearsay. 17 THE COURT: Your response, Mr. Tilt? 18 MR. TILT: He said that it's in -- the witness' 19 testimony was that it was in Metro Title's file. They relied 20 on it for purposes of conducting the closing. That sounds like 21 an argument as to weight, not as to admissibility. 22 THE COURT: All right. 23 Mr. Johnson? 24 MR. JOHNSON: I'm not sure I follow that. I mean, 25 they're offering this as the Weber County Recorder's abstract

of title, and that hasn't been established. THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Tilt? 2 3 MR. TILT: No. Except for the fact that this was actually something that was produced by counsel in the briefing 4 5 and -- and so I'm curious as to why he's objecting. It's got their Bates number on it. I think that's their Bates number. 6 7 In any event, that was offered by them in the briefing. So I 8 don't know that there would be a valid basis to object to it. 9 THE COURT: The ruling of the Court is that this 10 fits within the business records exception as a business record 11 of Metro National Title. It is not being offered as a record 12 from the county recorder's office. It is being offered as a 13 business record maintained in the files of Metro National 14 Title. 15 Whether it is an accurate abstract from the county 16 recorder's office, I'm making no determination of that at this 17 point. I'm simply ruling that this is a business record 18 maintained in the business records of Metro National Title. 19 And it is being -- it has been described as such by a custodian 20 of those records, a representative of Metro National Title. 21 on that basis, it is admitted. 22 You may proceed. (Exhibit 1, Tab 9 received.) 23 24 (By Mr. Tilt) Let's have you turn to Exhibit 1, 25 Tab 2, please. Do you recognize that document?

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That is a --
            A
                Yes.
                What is that?
 2
                -- a copy of the recorded special warranty deed
 3
     dated in April of 2007, by which Brett and Traci Del Valle, as
 4
     trustees of the Del Valle Family Trust, acquired title to the
 5
     subject property.
 6
                MR. TILT: Move for admission of Exhibit 2 into
 7
     evidence.
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 9
                THE COURT: Any objection?
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                MR. JOHNSON: No objection.
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                THE COURT: Tab 2 of P-1 is received.
12
                 (Exhibit 1, Tab 2 received.)
            Q (By Mr. Tilt) Let's have you turn to Tab 3 of
13
     Exhibit 1, please. Do you recognize that document?
14
                That is a warranty deed by and between a re -- a
15
     copy of the recorded warranty deed by and between Brett and
16
     Traci Del Valle as trustees of the Del Valle Family Trust to
17
    Brett and Traci Del Valle as trustees of the Del Valle Family
18
19
     Trust.
                MR. TILT: Move for admission of Exhibit 3 into
20
    evidence.
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                THE COURT: Any objection to Tab 3?
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                MR. JOHNSON: No objection.
24
                THE COURT: Tab 3 is received.
25
                 (Exhibit 1, Tab 3 received.)
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Page

0 (By Mr. Tilt) In connection with the search of the 1 2 property for the -- for the closing on the trust sale to the 3 Mulligans, so referring I guess to Exhibit 9, the abstract from 4 -- from Metro's records, did Metro ever find any deed from the 5 Del Valle Family Trust to Brett Del Valle, personally? A No. 6 7 Did Metro ever find any conveyance of the property 0 from Brett Del Valle personally to the Del Valle Family Trust? 8 9 A No. 10 I'd actually like to have you look at Exhibit 7 11 again. Tab 7 of Exhibit 1. And take whatever time you need 12 to. Is -- my question -- my first question is whether there is 13 any real property description in that document. 14 No, there is not. 15 Is there, in Exhibit 7, any reference to the Del 16 Valle Family Trust? 17 No, there is no reference to the Del Valle Family 18 Trust. 19 In the Exhibit 9 abstract from Metro's records, is 20 there any reference in there to that Tab 7 judgment that we 21 just looked at? 22 No, there is not. 23 Was it required for the Mulligans' purchase funds 24 to be paid out to Axos and to Emerald? 25 Α Yes.

Q Why?

A Because the contract sale between Brett and Traci as trustees of the Del Valle Family Trust as sellers and the Mulligans as buyers, required that all encumbrances against the property be paid at or before closing, number one. And number two, that a policy of title insurance be issued to the Mulligans which would not disclose any such encumbrances.

Q If the -- let's see. Based on the order of recording, I'll just represent to you that we have -- the BOFI trust deed was recorded, Exhibit 4 -- Exhibit 1, Tab 4 -- was recorded September of 2017. The Emerald Bay trust deed, Exhibit 1, Tab 5, was recorded in July of 2020, and the Exhibit 1, Tab 7 document, the Alum Rock notice of judgment was recorded in November of 2020.

If the Mulligans were subrogated to the priority position of those two trust deeds that they paid off, Exhibits 4 and 5, would that change the priority of Alum Rock's lien at all? Would that change the position?

A No, it would not.

Q Why?

A Because the -- those two deeds of trusts, those two encumbrances shown in Exhibit 1, Tabs 5 and 6, pre-dated the Alum Rock -- the entry of the Alum Rock judgment. So they enjoyed priority as a matter of -- as a matter of law, and as a matter of title practice.

1 MR. JOHNSON: Objection. The -- the witness is 2 offering a legal opinion. 3 THE COURT: Sustained. (By Mr. Tilt) How long have you worked at Metro 4 Title? 5 I've been at Metro for 14 and a half years. 6 A Has that always been in the capacity as vice 7 president and general counsel? 8 9 A Yes. 10 And what do your duties entail in that capacity? 11 I consult with title and escrow officers regarding 12 questions that may come up with regard to title issues, with 13 regard to escrow issues. I also process and administer any 14 claims that are made through Metro National Title. I also 15 supervise and administer the sister company of Metro National 16 Title, being Metro National Exchange Services. And 17 occasionally close transactions. 18 What was your position prior to that position you just described with Metro? 19 20 Immediately prior to Metro, I was senior -- vice president senior -- let me try that again. Vice president, 21 senior claims counsel, for First American Title Insurance 22 23 Company for 17 years. 24 And what were your duties in that capacity? 25 A In that capacity, I administered claims, supervised

1	litigation, supervised and managed litigation in connection
2	with those claims.
3	Q Did that involve any analysis of legal or title
4	issues?
5	A Yes.
6	Q And what what was your employment prior to that
7	position with First American?
8	A Prior to that, I was with First American Title
9	Insurance Company as a chief underwriter. My my position
10	I was I'd been I was with First American from 1984
11	forward to 1994, which is when I was made senior claims
12	counsel. During that period, 1984 to 1994, I was wore
13	various hats, particularly involving underwriting, as well as
14	claims administration.
15	Q When you say underwriting, what does what does
16	that mean? What were your duties with regard to underwriting?
17	A That is making decisions with regard to the
18	insurability of title in any given situation.
19	Q Does that involve reviewing title commitments or
20	reports?
21	A Yes.
22	Q Does that involve doing any actual searching?
23	A Not actual searching, but reviewing searches that
24	have been done, and examining documents and determining the

effect of those documents vis-a-via the title to the property

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1
     and its -- and the effect on its insurability.
 2
                 And did you do any such underwriting work with --
 3
     have you with Metro since you moved to Metro Title?
 4
            A
                 Yes. Essentially that same function.
 5
            0
                 Okay. Prior to 1984, what is your employment
 6
     history?
 7
                 I was employed by Associated Title Company from 19
 8
     -- I don't -- it goes so far -- so far back these days. I was
 9
     employed by Associated Title Company prior to First American.
10
     And prior to that, I was employed by Guaranteed Title Company
11
     from 1978 to 1980.
12
                 And in '78 to '81, I see on your CV that you were
13
     an abstractor. What is that?
14
                 That's essentially title searching. Searching
15
     titles. Examining documents.
16
            Q
                 And after you moved out of abstracting and you
17
     moved in -- what was your -- what was your title? I don't know
18
     if I caught that.
19
                At Guaranteed Title?
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            0
                Yes.
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                I started off --
            Α
22
                And Associate.
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                 -- as doing abstracting and that type of thing.
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     Ultimately -- it was a small company. Ultimately, I was
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     president of it for a year or so.
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THE COURT: The Court denies the request to

So I would object on that basis.

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certify, effectively, the witness as an expert. The Court doesn't certify experts. So that's -- that's an inappropriate request in that regard.

The only question that arises when opinions are made the subject of question, is whether that opinion can be expressed. Opinions can only be expressed by people who have training and experience to justify the expression of those opinions.

So the Court declines the request to certify the expert, simply because that is not the role of the Court, and will permit the expression of the opinion that's been elicited, subject to the following limitations.

To the extent that the opinion addresses a legal issue, witnesses do not determine legal questions. The Court determines legal issues. And so any opinion expressed by a witness that addresses a legal matter will be given whatever weight the Court considers appropriate. But it's certainly not binding on the Court, and does not establish the truth of the matter asserted, i.e. the legal conclusion being alleged.

The objection to any legal conclusion being expressed by the witness is sustained. He can express his opinion, and whatever that opinion may be may be considered by the Court and given whatever weight the Court determines is appropriate. But it is not binding on the Court, and does not constitute any legal determination by the Court.

1 So subject to that restriction, the witness may 2 express his opinion on that issue. 3 MR. TILT: Thank you, Your Honor. (By Mr. Tilt) So I return to the question, then, 4 of whether, in your opinion, as an officer of Metro Title and 5 as a person experienced with title examination and effect --6 and determining the legal effect from an insurability 7 standpoint on real property, the question is, if the Mulligans 8 were subrogated to the position, or placed in the shoes of 9 10 those two trust deeds, Exhibits 4 and 5, their funds paid off, would that affect -- would that put -- would that affect the 11 priority of any judgment lien held by Alum Rock? 12 A Not in my opinion. 13 14 MR. TILT: No further questions. 15 THE COURT: And again, for clarification, the 16 expression of that opinion does not constitute any legal 17 determination by the Court, it's not binding upon the Court, 18 and will be given whatever weight the Court determines is 19 appropriate. 20 MR. TILT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. 21 22 Mr. Johnson, your cross examination? 23 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Judge. 24

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Page

Brett Del Valle as trustee of the Brett Del Valle Family Trust, which is how title is held.

Okay. So if -- if I'm understanding correctly, there was no search for a judgment against Brett Del Valle individually?

> Individually, no. A

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1	Q	And why was that?
2	А	Because he held title as trustee of the trust, and
3	not individ	ually.
4	Q	Are you familiar with Utah Code 75-7-505?
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	And it says just to state it, it says, "During
7	the lifetime	e of a settlor, the property of a revocable trust is
8	subject to t	the claims of the settlor's creditors."
9	А	Uh-huh. Yes.
10	Q	Were you aware that Brett Del Valle was a settlor
11	of the trust	:?
12	А	No, I don't believe we were.
13	Q ,	Okay. Let's look at Exhibit 1.
14	r	THE COURT: So Tab 1 of P-1?
15	*	MR. JOHNSON: Excuse me. Yes. Tab 1 of Exhibit 1.
16		THE WITNESS: Yes, I see that.
17	Q	(By Mr. Johnson) And what do you see?
18	A	I see that Brett and Traci Del Valle are designated
19	as trustors,	and Brett and Traci are also named as co-trustees.
20	Q	And and if they're trustors, that's the same as
21	being a sett	clor?
22	A	That would be correct, yes.
23		MR. TILT: Objection. Asks for a legal conclusion.
24		THE COURT: Sustained, with the same limitation
25	that was pre	eviously included.

25

I believe -- and maybe -- I may have misspoken

earlier. I believe there was a search done under the Del Valle

name, and nothing came up either individually or as trust --2 well, I take that back. I think there was a judgment. Not the 3 Alum Rock judgment. Another judgment, which I believe had been 4 satisfied in a separate transaction. But there were no 5 judgments found in the -- under the name Del Valle, either 6 individually or as trustee of the trust. 7 Do you know that for certain, or are you just 8 quessing? No, I know that for certain. I've looked at the 9 A 10 records. 11 How -- how do you know that anyone in your office searched for judgments against Brett Del Valle in his 12 13 individual capacity? 14 Because those names appear on the search documents, 15 the abstracts that are -- copies of which are retained in our files. 16 17 Are you saying that there's a document that's been introduced today that shows that your office searched under the 18 19 name of Brett Del Valle individually? 20 No document that's been introduced today. 21 Q Okay. So there's no document introduced today that 22 shows that your office searched under the name Brett Del Valle 23 individually. So how are we to know that your office actually

individual capacity?

did do a search under the name of Brett Del Valle in his

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- That's what I'm here to testify to, I suppose. A
 - But you don't even know who did the search?
- It's a -- one of the people in our search department. There are a number of them. It could have been any of them.
 - Have you -- have you -- what have you done to talk to the people in your office who did the search to determine if they searched for --
 - I --Α
- -- Brett Del Valle individually?
- I did not speak to people that did the search. I 11 relied on what is in the file. Because the file discloses what 12 13 was done.
 - But again, nothing introduced today shows that search having been conducted, correct?
 - That's correct. A
 - Now you -- you gave some testimony, I think, along the lines of that it -- the judgment doesn't show up in an abstract of title?
 - Α That's correct.
 - Okay. Is -- what's the -- what's the process of an Q Is that something the county recorder does? abstract?
- 23 Α Yes.
- Okay. Are you saying that the county recorder did 24 25 something wrong when the judgment was recorded?

I'm not saying one way or the other. All I'm 1 2 saying is what was discovered in our search. I'm not saying 3 that anybody is at fault. I don't know who may have done what. 4 I'm saying it was not there. 5 In -- in normal process, do you have knowledge of 6 how the county recorder would abstract a judgment? 7 I know their -- I know from looking at the 8 abstracts that they generate. How they do it, what the process is behind that, I have no idea. 9 Do you know the -- do you have an understanding of 10 11 the process of how a judgment is recorded in the State of Utah 12 to become a judgment lien? 13 A I --14 MR. TILT: Objection. Asks for a legal conclusion. 15 THE WITNESS: Yeah. Generally. 16 MR. JOHNSON: What's -- what's --17 THE COURT: Any -- any -- any response, given the objection, will have the same limitation previously imposed. 18 19 Expertise with respect to the subject matter appears to justify 20 the expression of the opinion. But any opinion is not accepted 21 or binding upon the Court as a legal conclusion, only the 22 expression of the opinion of the witness. (By Mr. Johnson) What's your understanding of how 23 24 a judgment could become a judgment lien against a property?

Well, it is recorded with the county recorder's

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Α

office, and should be, presumably, is then abstracted in the 1 judgment index of the county recorder. 3 And that's a process of something the county does? That's correct. 4 A Okay. Is there a way to search the judgment index? 5 0 Yes. 6 A 7 And can you -- can you search by the name of individuals? 8 That's correct. 9 Α 10 And did Metro Title attempt a search of the 11 judgment index and look for a judgment against Brett Del Valle 12 individually? 13 A Yes. Well, they ran -- yes. They ran the Del 14 Valle name and -- with the expectation that it would disclose 15 any judgments against him individually, as well as trustee. 16 Now, I'm confused on this point. You don't -- you 17 don't actually know if they -- if someone ran a search for Brett Del Valle individually, correct? 18 19 Based upon the documentation in the file --A 20 But -- but --0 21 -- I have reached that conclusion, yes. 22 But not of any of the records that have been 23 presented in court today? 24 There's -- I don't believe there are any documents 25 presented today.

This is just your general understanding? 1 0 This is my knowledge based on reviewing the file. 2 3 You -- you haven't talked to the people who conducted the search? 4 5 A No. You haven't asked them how they did the search? 6 7 It's -- all of that information is in the 8 file. 9 The file that's not before the Court today? 0 10 A Correct. Well, or portions of it. 11 Can I have you look at Tab 8? And again, can you 12 identify what this document is? It's the posting summary showing all of the 13 14 receipts and disbursements by Metro National Title in 15 connection with the transaction that's the subject of this 16 proceeding. 17 And the -- under receipts, it says payor Molly J. Mulligan and John P. Mulligan. Do you see where I'm at? And 18 19 then there's the sum of \$1,775,896.73? 20 Uh-huh. Yes. A 21 Did that money come from the Mulligans or the 22 Mulligans' lender? 23 At the time of closing, it came from the Mulligans. A 24 0 How do you know it came from the Mulligans? 25 Because, first of all, that's what it says here. A

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Any objection to Tabs 13, 14, and 15 as
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                 THE COURT:
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     certified copies of court records?
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                MR. JOHNSON:
                              No objection.
                 THE COURT: Tabs 13, 14, and 15 are received.
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                 (Exhibit 1, Tabs 13, 14, 15 received.)
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                MR. TILT: I just have closing argument then, Your
 6
 7
     Honor.
                THE COURT: All right.
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                Well, we'll turn to Mr. Johnson.
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                Any evidentiary presentation that you're
11
     anticipating, Mr. Johnson?
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                MR. JOHNSON:
                              No.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Then we will move to
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     argument.
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                Mr. Tilt, you may proceed.
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                MR. TILT: Obviously counsel's queries to the
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     witness with regard to the entirety of Metro Title's file not
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     being here today are a little bit tongue in cheek, because we
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     are here on an expedited hearing. If -- if counsel wants to
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     have those, he's already got them, per a prior subpoena, number
21
     one. And he's welcome to schedule a deposition to talk with
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     Mr. Heiner--I'm sure he'd cooperate--to discuss that more
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     fully.
                 The point of today's proceedings, though, is that
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     there is a judgment lien foreclosure sale scheduled for January
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Document 24-1

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In fact, the very last page of the trust, Exhibit 1, Tab 1, provides a schedule or -- a Schedule A inventory of trust estate. Under community property, nothing is listed.

Document 24-1

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The date that this has on it, at the first page of

Exhibit 1, Tab 9, is 5-11-2021. I'll submit that that's the same date that Exhibit 10 -- Exhibit 1, Tab 10 -- was recorded. The deed from the trust to the Mulligans.

In other words, at no time--and the witness said this--at no time in any record shown in any abstract did Brett Del Valle personally have any interest in this property. The only evidence before this Court is that Brett Del Valle did not contribute that property to the trust. The trust bought that property on its own accord. Brett Del Valle did not contribute that property to the trust.

Therefore, Alum Rock can have no lien on that property at all, because the statute says they can only have a lien to the extent of the settlor's contribution, which in this case, so far, the evidence is zero.

The -- the other issue, main issue in this case is that, even if there is a -- a right or ability of Alum Rock to reach any extent of that property at all, if Brett was shown in this case ever to have actually contributed that property to the trust, then that would be the extent of their interest. That might be 1 percent. That might be 25 percent. It might be 50 percent.

We don't know what that is. And without any knowledge of any contribution by Brett at all, much less the extent of any contribution by Brett, there cannot be a foreclosure allowed on the real property with regard to a writ

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of execution that is effective only against Brett, on a judgment that only is against Brett, that is not a judgment against the trust.

Document 24-1

Even if any part of the property was contributed by Brett, and even if any part of the property, therefore, is subject to the writ as claimed by Alum Rock, that is equitably sub -- subordinated to the Mulligans' interest.

The Mulligans paid \$1.75 million in cash for this property, \$712,000 of which paid off a prior lien of the Axos The Exhibit 1, Tab 4 trust deed. Another \$948,000 of which went to pay another trust deed, Exhibit 1, Tab 5 -excuse me Exhibit 1 -- yeah, Exhibit 1, Tab 5, the Emerald Bay Capital trust deed, as shown by the Exhibit 8 posting summary.

So because the Mulligans paid off those prior encumbrances, which were obligations owed by the trust, not owed by the Mulligans, the law provides that they are equitably subrogated to the position of those liens that they paid off.

And that is because the doctrine of equitable subrogation is an equitable doctrine. It -- it says that judgement lien creditors such as Alum Rock should not be elevated to a priority position which it would not otherwise have had, simply because there was a payoff of other liens and encumbrances on the property when the -- when the judgment here could not -- that's claimed by Alum Rock, the judgment could not be found in a title search.

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So it -- it would be a windfall to Alum Rock to allow them to foreclose without taking into account and 3 subordinating its interest to this \$1.75 million that the Mulligans, as testimony was, were required to pay off in order to close their loan -- in order to close their purchase of the property and get title conveyed to them. 6 7 They did not do that as a volunteer or an

intermeddler. They did that to pay off an obligation owed by somebody else, because they were required to.

So equitably, they ought to enjoy the -- step into the same shoes as that party, and not allow a lien foreclosure by Alum Rock.

It's telling, frankly, that the -- the timing of this. We have the judgment lien of Alum Rock, which is Exhibit 7--Exhibit 1, Tab 7--was recorded in November of 2020. And at that time, the Exhibit 4 and the Exhibit 5 trust deeds were already of record against the property. So Alum Rock did nothing.

And they waited and they waited and they waited, until May of '21, those judgment -- those prior trust deeds get paid off. And then it's not until June of '21 that Alum Rock then files its writ of execution -- files the application for writ of execution, which is Exhibit 13 in the binder.

They did exactly what the law is not -- does not allow them to do. They laid in wait, knowing that they were

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junior to those prior encumbrances on the property, and then they sprang up in hopes to enforce a judgment owed by Brett against the Mulligans' property. And that is an inequitable windfall situation.

And it is not inequitable, by contrast, to allow the Mulligans to -- to be subrogated to the priority position of the trust deeds that they paid off, because that is -- that leaves Alum Rock in the exact same position it was before. cannot foreclose as against those interests that it could not have foreclosed against anyway.

The plaintiff argued in the brief -- or excuse me, the Alum Rock argued in the briefs that -- over the burden of proof and whether there was a requirement for -- it's been our contention all along that under 75-7-505(1), where the statute says that the judgment lien creditor, Alum Rock, can only reach the property to the extent of Brett's contribution in it, that it would be Alum Rock's burden to prove what that interest of Brett was, what his contribution interest was in the property, and therefore what they can foreclose against.

Counsel has argued in the briefs that, no, it's -the Mulligans are the plaintiffs in this case, and it therefore is the Mulligans who have the burden of proof on that issue. But if the Court looks at Exhibit 13, the application for writ of execution, and Exhibit 14, the actual writ of execution that were issued out of the Third District Court, Alum Rock is

identified as the plaintiff. Exhibit 14 is the writ of execution that is the subject of, and the basis for the foreclosure sale that they have scheduled for January 21st. In other words, in -- insofar as a potential sale on the 21st goes, it is Alum Rock who is the plaintiff. It is Alum Rock who, by statute, therefore, has to prove the extent

their writ. 8

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And again, even if it was the Mulligans' burden to prove, as plaintiffs in this case, we think, for the reasons I've outlined earlier, that we have met that burden of proof, at least sufficient enough to require the foreclosure sale be restrained pending further discovery and further litigation in due course.

of any interest that they could potentially foreclose on under

When I got here today, I had found that I neglected to put a copy of this case in my materials. But I do want to provide a citation. And I'm happy to provide copies later if necessary. But there's an Arizona case, Sourcecorp Inc. versus Norcutt, it is 258 P.3d 281 from the Arizona Court of Appeals 2011, which deals with a case that is --

THE COURT: Give me that citation again.

MR. TILT: Sure.

THE COURT: 258 P.3d.

MR. TILT: 258 P.3d 281 --

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. TILT: -- Arizona Court of Appeals, 2011. called Sourcecorp versus Norcutt. The facts of that case are eerily similar to this one.

Norcutts paid cash to buy a home. In that case, the title company had missed a judgment lien held by Sourcecorp. Sourcecorp initiated a sheriff's sale proceeding, and eventually the court, on appeal, said that equitable subrogation applied and that Sourcecorp could not foreclose against Norcutt.

Now obviously you substitute Mulligans for Norcutt and Alum Rock for Sourcecorp, and you have our case here. Mulligans paid cash to buy a home. There was a judgment lien held by Alum Rock. And Alum Rock is now attempting to conduct a sheriff's sale.

The Court of Appeals in that case accepted the equitable subrogation arguments of the Norcutts, so the folks in the position of -- of Mulligans, explaining that -- that the Norcutts stepped into the shoes of the prior creditors that they had paid off, because they were sub -- oh, the court was -- the court was aware of the doctrine that the property -real property is unique and irreplaceable, and that factored large in the opinion.

But the court said that the equitable subrogation doctrine applied, because otherwise Sourcecorp, or Alum Rock, would have been elevated to a priority position just due to a

mistake in a title search.

And I'm not suggesting there was actually a mistake in the title search. That is what it is. And the -- the trust, the seller of the property, did not have any judgment against it. The -- the settlor, Brett, if he's a settlor, did have a judgment against him. And we concede that that is recorded. But it wasn't findable in the judgment record, as the testimony was, that Brett's name didn't come up in a search of the judgment records. So it wasn't findable.

And under those facts, the court analyzed the four equitable subrogation elements, which are that the party asserted -- party asserting subrogation has paid the debt.

That definitely has occurred in connection with this case.

Number two, the party asserting subrogation was not a volunteer. That also is established in this case. Because they were required to pay that off to get clear title to the property.

Number three, the party asserting subrogation was not primarily liable for the debt. The face of those trust deeds themselves show that those were debts of the Brett Del Valle Family Trust. They were not the Mulligans' debts or obligation.

And number four, no injustice would be done to the other party by allowing subrogation. That also is the case here. Because Alum Rock always was subject to those prior two

trust deeds. There's no reason why they should be elevated to a position to -- that would be a windfall to them, to the substantial prejudice of the Mulligans, whose real property would potentially be lost to this judgment lien foreclosure.

So excuse me. We submit that certainly -- in the case at large, we think there's a substantial likelihood that we will prevail. But we certainly feel like we have shown sufficient evidence of that for purposes of today's hearing, to establish the elements for a preliminary injunction.

Injunctive relief will be afforded under Rule 65A if there's a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits. And we've discussed that. Indeed, Your Honor already held in November in the separate case that the Mulligans were entitled to prevail and show what interest of Brett's, if any, the contribution interest, was, in fact, subject to the writ of execution.

The second element under Rule 65A is the applicant will suffer irreparable injury. I quoted the case law earlier where Utah has long recognized that each piece of property is considered legally unique, and therefore irreplaceable. And therefore, irreparable injury is met.

The injury to the applicant outweighs any injury to the restraining party is the third element under 65A. And again, Mulligans losing their irreplaceable real property versus Alum Rock being forestalled from foreclosing and

collecting cash money is -- the balance of harms certainly weighs in favor of the Mulligans in this case.

And the order -- the final element is that the order or injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. We submit that absolutely is the case. It actually would be supportive of the public interest. Because again, under 75-7-505(1), it is the Alum Rock folks' burden to prove what contribution interest, if any, Brett made to the property, and to prove, therefore, the maximum possible extent of any foreclosure of the Alum Rock lien against that property.

So we submit all those elements are met, that the Court ought to issue the preliminary injunction and allow this case to move forward in -- in due course.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

MR. TILT: Thank you.

THE COURT: Response, Mr. Johnson?

MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Judge.

Alum -- Alum Rock continues to believe this is simply the wrong forum for all of these issues to be raised. Again, there is a pending matter in the Third District Court where the Mulligans have already challenged the writ of execution, and whether or not Alum Rock should be able to proceed with the writ of execution.

If we look at the Mulligans' Exhibit 15, they've already briefed some of these issues before the Third District

Court. Specifically on page 3, their paragraph 4, it says, "The writ of execution was issued improperly because." If you look at the second paragraph, they argue, "The writ of execution is available only to seize property in possession or under the control of the judgment debtor, Brett Del Valle, an individual.

"However, as shown under item 3, herein above,
Brett Del Valle, an individual, does not own the property
presently, has not owned it, further, and has never owned the
property. The property has been in the possession and under
the --" And then they continue to mention that the property is
now owned to the Mulligans.

So for three years now, the Mulligans have been arguing that Alum Rock doesn't have a right to proceed with this writ of execution. And they had the opportunity to present every argument as to why the writ of execution should not be allowed. And they -- and they lost, ultimately.

They had -- they had other arguments, that the judgment lien wasn't properly recorded. Went up to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court said, you have a writ -- the writ -- the judgment lien is valid. And under Utah law, because Brett Del Valle was the settlor, the judgment lien applies to the property.

And -- and now we have more -- more argument, more nuanced arguments about why Alum Rock can't proceed with its

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writ of execution. Specifically, we're citing to 75-7-505. it clearly states that, "During the lifetime of a settlor, the property of a revocable trust is subject to the claims of the settlor's creditors." That -- that was argued, briefed in the writ of -- before Judge Mow in the Third District Court.

Now they want to argue the second part of that second sentence. And we believe that those arguments should have been brought. Should have, could have, been brought before Judge Mow. And this gets to the issues that we mainly relied on, which is a matter of jurisdiction, and whether this Court should entertain jurisdiction of what is an issue before the Third District.

And we have the principle of comity. There is -there is one particular cite that I -- I want to read. can find it. It is the Burningham versus United States case. And when you have one district court handling a matter and then another district court is brought in on the same issues -- this is page 11 our -- page 11 of our brief. "Comity dictates that courts of coordinate jurisdiction not review, enjoin, or otherwise interfere with another's jurisdiction."

This Court needs to take a hard look at -- at what are the issues, legal issues, before Judge Mow in the Third District, and decide whether it wants to be enjoining the Second -- Second -- the Third District Court. We would urge and argue that this Court should not do that. That if the

Mulligans believe they have additional legal arguments about
why the writ of execution should not proceed, that those issues
should be brought before the Third District Court.

Document 24-1

They -- they could have brought this very proceeding. They could have filed a motion for temporary restraining order and a motion for preliminary injunction in the Third District. They could have made all of these same arguments.

The problem they have is, that they didn't bring any of these arguments, back in 2020 and 2021, initially. And now they're bringing new legal arguments about why the writ of execution should not be allowed to proceed. This is where the issue of claim -- claim preclusion comes in. There are no new facts here. They simply failed to bring these legal arguments before the Third District Court.

The Third District Court issued a final ruling -excuse me, issued a final judgment in the matter allowing Alum
Rock to proceed with its writ of execution. That final
judgment was then appealed to the Supreme Court, and Judge
Mow's decision was upheld.

Exhibit 2 to our brief is the ruling and order of Judge Mow, discussing all the legal issues presented by the Mulligans at that time.

Exhibit 3 is our -- the Supreme Court decision affirming the decision. And for those reasons, again, this

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Court should just decline to exercise jurisdiction.

There's a -- a related legal issue. This is really a collateral attack of the Third District Court's decision. We've included briefing on that.

In terms of process, there's been suggestions that we are trying to take advantage of -- of the Mulligans somehow. After the -- or playing games with our writ of execution.

After the Supreme Court issued its ruling, we immediately contacted the Weber County Sheriff to proceed with our writ of execution. And in November, they finally were able to move forward with the sale. They noticed up the sale. It had nothing to do with the timing of this other matter that was heard before you. And that sale is now cancelled, pursuant to the Court's order.

This -- this matter is now the Mulligans' third attempt to enjoin the sale of this property. They -- they lost with Judge -- Judge Mow. They seemingly didn't like the Court's prior ruling in this -- this other matter brought by the other judgment creditor. I don't know why they withdrew their motion, but they withdrew the motion and then filed this action.

That's all the argument I have, unless the Court has any questions.

THE COURT: I don't have any additional questions. Thank you, counsel.

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1 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. 2 THE COURT: Any reply, Mr. Tilt? 3 MR. TILT: Briefly, yes. Counsel has said a couple of times that we had 4 every opportunity to raise every argument to Judge Mow. But in 5 6 fact, we did not. Theirs was merely a writ proceeding. 7 Utah Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that a writ proceeding is not an action with respect to real property. 8 9 And in the writ proceeding, the court's forms as to 10 the bases for potential objections are merely whether the 11 issuance of the writ is -- is improper, or attackable somehow. 12 Everything that was dealt with in the Third District in the 13 writ proceeding had only to do with statutory compliance for a 14 judgment lien and rule compliance for a writ of execution. 15 had nothing whatsoever to do with the real property interests, 16 as the Supreme Court has already said now was correct. Because 17 that was not an action with regard to real property. And under the venue statute quoted by the Alum Rock 18 19 court in this case, the Supreme Court, the venue statute says

And under the venue statute quoted by the Alum Rock court in this case, the Supreme Court, the venue statute says that actions involving real property, quote, "shall be tried in the county in which the subject of the action is situated."

There's an ellipsis in there. Shall.

There is no jurisdiction for us to have brought any of our real property claims that are the subject of this case, quiet title, and declaratory judgment and so forth, no

jurisdiction for us to bring that before Judge Mow. We couldn't have brought anything but the claims that we did bring in connection with Judge Mow.

And we are not here collaterally attacking that.

We understand it's gone up on appeal and we lost on appeal.

But the only thing that was dealt with by Judge Mow, the only thing that was dealt with by the Utah Supreme Court is whether there was statutory compliance for a judgment lien, and whether there were -- was an appropriate writ issued under the requirements of the rule.

The Court did not rule on any real property claims. The Court told us that when we tried to invoke the venue statute to say that Judge Mow didn't have authority to issue the writ out of his Court, the Court excoriated us in paragraphs 65 and 66 saying, "There is no cause of action here at all." Indeed -- quote at page -- paragraph 66 of the Supreme Court opinion. "Indeed, no cause of action is at issue at all," period.

And then it goes on a few sentences later, in paragraph 65, "Simply put, this proceeding," not action, "this proceeding to enforce that judgment through a writ of execution is not an action involving real property governed by the venue statute."

So we could not -- we did not bring any of these claims before. We haven't been rejected on any of these claims

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Counsel says this is our third attempt to -- to get a bite at this apple. It's our first attempt.

We were not even a party to the writ case. That was between -- that was just a domestication of the judgment from California between only Alum Rock and Brett Del Valle personally. Mulligans were not a party to that. They had limited ability to object under the write proceedings. brought what we could brought -- what we could bring.

Counsel -- so -- so we didn't bring that case. We did attempt to bring Alum Rock into the Single Box case. And we had that hearing that I mentioned in November with Your Honor. And counsel queries why we withdrew our motion. was because Alum Rock filed this foreclosure action -proceeded with the sheriff sale for the foreclosure. And there was just no ability for us to do anything in that case.

We therefore had to file a new case in order to get this before the Court in a timely manner. And we felt it was disingenuous to the Court to have two different lawsuits asserting the same claims against Alum Rock. And we had -- we would have been chided for that by -- by counsel if we had done it that way. We were trying to keep a clear record, is all.

There's no collateral attack on the issuance of the That's been upheld. We get it. Or on whether there's a judgment lien. We've been up -- that's been upheld. We get it.

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writ of execution.

But as Your Honor noted in the hearing in November, in the Single Box case, Footnote 7 of the Supreme Court opinion 2 3 in this Alum Rock case, it says that there has not been a determination as to the extent of the lien and that there is a 4 5 -- it is therefore appropriate for us to have -- put Alum Rock to their burden of proof under the statute to prove what 6 Brett's contribution interest to the property was as a 7 co-settlor, since that is the sole extent of any property they 8 9 can reach, whether it be by judgment lien or by writ. 10 So with that, Your Honor, I'll submit the motion, 11 unless there are any questions from the Court. 12 THE COURT: I don't have any additional questions. 13 Thank you, counsel. 14 The matter that's before the Court today is a 15 request for a preliminary injunction. Much of the argument and 16 evidence and exhibits that have been presented extend well 17 beyond the issues that are directly before the Court. 18 As has been correctly noted by Mr. Tilt in his 19 reply, actions involving executions and objections to 20 executions call into question two specific issues. And by rule 21 those issues are whether the execution -- whether the writ was 22 properly issued, and the second issue, which is not 23 particularly relevant here, is whether the property is exempt

from execution. That is also a proper basis for objecting to a

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As Mr. Tilt has also correctly acknowledged, there is no question as to the propriety of the writ of execution. That's not an issue that's before the Court. That has been decided. It was decided by Judge Mow. The -- that issue was appealed, and has been decided by the Supreme Court. And this Court is not in a position to do anything with respect to those determinations.

The -- the holding of the Supreme Court, and this is found in paragraph 3, they set forth three specific holdings. "We hold that Alum Rock created a judgment lien when it recorded the judgment in the county recorder's office." That is no longer subject to dispute. That's been determined. That's final.

Second, and I'm quoting again, "We hold that the writ was available against the property, even though the title was held in the name of the revocable trust, because Brett retained an indicia of ownership over the property when the lien was created." That issue is no longer the subject of dispute and is no longer the subject of consideration by this Court. That has been decided by the Supreme Court.

So the writ was available, and Alum Rock created a judgment lien. So the lien exists and the writ exists.

And number three, "We hold that the Mulligans have not identified a relevant limitation on the district court's jurisdiction that would prevent the issuance of the writ."

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Those three holdings, in composite, establish the validity of the writ, and that it has attached to the property. And those are questions of enforcement of the writ. And they are not before this Court, and are not considered by this Court. They have been resolved.

Whether there were arguments made by the Mulligans to Judge Mow in 2021 before the issues went to appeal does not leave those issues pending now. Those issues are not pending. Those issues have been decided. And whatever arguments the Mulligans may have made with respect to either the validity or enforceability of the writ itself, its issuance, its attachment to the property interest, and the absence of any proper objection, have all been determined.

What the Supreme Court did not determine -- and this is, again, the focus of the Court's prior discussion in the related case-- addressed in Footnote 7, which is -- and I'm quoting from that footnote. "Neither side has addressed whether Traci's joint ownership of the property has any effect on the judgment lien. For that reason, we express no opinion on the matter."

There is not a determination by the Supreme Court as to what, or the extent of the property interest of Mr. Del Valle, or Brett Del Valle, or however you pronounce the name, I'm not sure. And I know everyone struggled and -- and pronounced that a little bit differently. That's not

particularly relevant.

But the question is, the extent of the interest to which the judgment attaches. There is no question that there is a judgment. There is no question that the judgment created a lien. There is no question that that judgment lien attaches to the property. The question is, what is the property?

Which raises the very question that Mr. Johnson suggests. Is this action an action to enforce the judgment, or is it an action to determine an interest in property?

The language of the Supreme Court decision is helpful in that regard. In this paragraph 66, which counsel just referred to in closing, there is a discussion -- or 65.

There is a discussion about the property interest and the distinction between an action for enforcement, the writ of execution, and an action to determine a property interest. And I quote from paragraph 65. In fact, I'm going to read the whole paragraph.

"The Mulligans have not identified any relevant law that would limit a district court's authority to issue a writ of execution to be effectuated in a county outside that court's judicial district."

That is the heart of the ruling of the Supreme

Court. The Third District Court did have the authority to

issue a writ against property in Weber County. And that is no

longer in dispute.

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And then I continue the quote. "We first cite a venue -- they first cite a venue statute which provides that, quote, "actions" and that's in internal quotes, for certain, quote, "causes involving real property shall be tried in the county in which the subject of the action is situated." And there is a reference to section 78B-3-301(1).

Document 24-1

And then the Supreme Court goes on, "Those causes are for the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest in the property for determination of the right or interest in the property, for injuries to real property, for the partition of real property, for the, quote, foreclosure of all liens and mortgages on real property."

In this case, the relevant language to this Court is the question at the beginning, when it says that these causes are -- and I'm going to simply focus on the language which this Court believes is critical for a current determination--so those causes are, or specifically include, the determination of the right or interest in the property.

The question that's before this Court today is, what is the right or interest of Brett Del Valle in the property? What is that right? The Supreme Court declined to opine on that very question in Footnote 7, saying that it's expressing no opinion on the impact of the ownership of someone else.

The ownership of someone else, a joint owner

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perhaps, affects the joint interest of the other joint owner. So determining the impact of that joint owner, the spouse, 2 co-settlor in this case, requires an evaluation of the 3 respective interests, at least of these two parties. 4 That is the determination of an interest in the 5 property. And that question is entirely independent of the 6 7 question of the validity or the authority of the court to issue 8 the writ of execution. It -- the Supreme Court certainly acknowledged by 9

its citation the reference to the rule that says, "The determination of causes involving the real property, which by its own language includes determination of interest in the property, are to be tried in the county where the property is located."

The Third District Court has not been asked to determine an interest in property. It's not been asked to determine what the respective rights of the co-settlors are, or the -- the ownership that may be reflected by either of them, or the contributions that they have made. That's not been addressed in the Third District. That is a determination of the interest in property.

And the Court notes, and the Supreme Court did essentially the same thing in its discussion of what the focus of that appeal was, which is the enforcement action, the execution itself, the writ of execution. Is the writ of

execution valid? And the Supreme Court determination that it was.

In -- and it references this interest in real property. And refers to the prior litigation in California, for example. And indicates that there's no indication that the litigation in California had anything to do with real property. And yet, that judgment that was obtained in California formed a proper basis for the entry of a judgment in the Third District. That recording of that judgment with the county recorder's office in Weber County, which created a lien for the holding of the Supreme Court. And an execution issued by the Third District Court based upon that lien.

So there's a judgment that was done in California. That doesn't mean the Third District Court stepped into that judgment or litigated any issue with respect to that judgment. That was not the issue before the Third District Court. And it didn't need to be. That was entirely outside of what the Third District Court was doing.

What the Third District Court did was pick it up as an enforcement action. A request for a writ. They granted the writ. The Supreme Court determined that that was proper and the writ is enforceable.

Now a question has arisen, what is the property -- what is the property interest that may be sold pursuant to that writ? That's not a determination of whether the writ was

validly issued, or whether the Third District Court had the authority to issue that writ. That is a question of what is the property interest involved? And that is the express question on which the Supreme Court declined to state an opinion. Because that would involve a determination of a property interest.

And so the ruling of the Court is, the issue that is before this Court is a separate interest. And that is the determination of the interest in the property. And that that is properly before this Court, and would not be properly referable to the Third District.

The Third District is not in a position to entertain an argument that, "Well, this property in Weber County belongs 50 percent to so-and-so and 40 percent to somebody else. Or 30/60. Or 30/70 -- 90 -- or 30/70, or 90/10, or there's no interest at all. We're going to determine that there is no interest in the property, or that there's 100 percent ownership in the property." That is a determination of the interest in the property. And that is not a proper question for the Third District Court to determine. The determination of the interest in the property lies in this court.

Now, I must say the Court has not been impressed by the multiple filings of actions by the Mulligans in this court which have raised similarly -- similar or overlapping issues.

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I understand that there has been shortness of time, and so certainly some allowance has to be made for that.

But the question, and the ruling of this Court, is that there is a property interest that has to be determined. Now that ruling does not impair the writ of execution at all as far as its validity and its enforcement. But what it does do is require that the execution not be confusing or inappropriate in its scope. And that is the execution may properly proceed against the interest of Brett Del Valle in the defined property.

The judgment lien has attached to it, and the execution is appropriate. And whatever Brett Del Valle has may be the subject of a proper execution. But the entire property has not been determined by this Court to be within the interest of Brett Del Valle. So any suggestion in the execution that the entire property may be sold, and that the buyer therefore may believe that they're obtaining some fee simple interest in the entire property, would be inappropriate. And for that reason, the Court believes that a preliminary injunction is appropriate, based upon the scope of the property interest that is perceived to be covered by the writ.

The Court does nothing at all to undermine or impair the validity of the writ, the validity of its issuance, or its current enforceability. But the ruling of the Court is that writ may only extend to whatever interest Brett Del Valle,

including his individual interest or his interest as a settlor of the trust, may have in the property. Those are the determinations of the Supreme Court. Those interests are subject to execution. But those interests have not yet been determined, and there is a dispute as to what those interests are.

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And so if Alum Rock wants to execute on those interests in the property, Alum Rock may. But the same situation would occur, for example, if there were a deed that conveyed this particular property to five different individuals and a judgment is obtained against one. That judgment, if a writ of execution is sought, regardless of the county in which it was sought, can't execute on the judgment of all of the individuals that are owners of the property. It can only execute on the interest of the individual who is subject to the judgment. And that's the same limitation that the Court is imposing here.

And so whatever interest Brett Del Valle has either individually or as a trustee of the trust is subject to execution. But in order to avoid confusion in title ownership or anything else, the Court will require that the execution be so limited. It's valid. It's enforceable. But it is restricted to the interest of Brett Del Valle, either individually, or as a settlor of the trust in the property.

And so that is the ruling of the Court. And the

preliminary injunction as to the current proposed sale, which contains no such limitation on the interest of the property to be sold, is granted.

Now, I -- I am aware that both by rule and in the request of Alum Rock, there was a request that a bond be posted, a security be posted in this case to protect the interest of Alum Rock. The Court declines to require that a bond be posted in this case, for the reason that there has already been a determination by the Supreme Court that there is a lien, that that lien is valid, and that it encumbers the property.

There's been no showing by Alum Rock, who is requesting the bond, that the property has the possibility of declining in value, or that it might be lost or that it might be removed from the jurisdiction of the court. It's real estate. And that real estate certainly has value. And there's been no showing of what bond may be appropriate to protect that value from any potential loss or damage that may occur while the injunction is in effect.

So the Court grants the preliminary injunction as expressly provided and limited by the Court. That is, the execution may not go forward in the current extent that suggests a sale of the entire property. And the Court will not require that a bond be posted to support that preliminary injunction.

So Mr. Tilt, I'm going to ask that you prepare a brief order consistent with that determination.

Significantly, the Court is making no ruling whatever on issues of equitable subrogation or the nature of extent of anyone's interest in the property. Those are determination of real property interest. They cannot be made, certainly in connection with a preliminary injunction hearing, to address the sufficiency of a writ of execution. They may very well be relevant and important for determination in the case, but they are not before the Court today.

The Court also notes that the Court makes no ruling today with respect to any other action in the prior case.

However, I am going to just make a couple of cautionary statements about that.

The Court has issued a ruling in that case, based upon the motion of the Mulligans, and the Court expects that an order will be submitted on that ruling. There has been a suggestion that, well, we're going to withdraw that motion. If there is going to be a withdrawal of the motion, I will require a hearing on the withdrawal of that motion to determine the propriety of withdrawing the motion after the Court has ruled on it.

That would, perhaps, be the same suggestion as suggesting that a judgment, once entered by the court, can be entirely voided simply by seeking to dismiss the action on

which the judgment was originally obtained.

I'm not making a ruling right now. But I am certainly not endorsing the suggestion that a party may await the ruling of the Court to determine whether they really want to go forward with their motion. That determination is made when the motion is argued. If it's going to be withdrawn, it can be withdrawn before the Court makes its ruling.

But after the Court makes its ruling, there is a ruling. And that does not permit a party simply to withdraw the motion because they don't like the result of the ruling.

So in this case, there is a ruling. The Court still expects a judgment. If you want to have an issue, or if you want to have argument on a motion to withdraw post determination, that can be considered. But the Court has not simply accepted it at face value. And I just want to make sure that everyone is aware of that.

So that's where we are. The preliminary injunction is granted. And that is as far as we're going. And the only impact on the execution is that the current description of the property that may be sold is inappropriate, or overbroad, given the property interest that may be properly subject to that execution.

So I am not precluding the execution from going forward, and I am not imposing any restriction on Alum Rock with respect to the determination or enforceability of that

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writ, but I am requiring that it be more -- that it more
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     properly define the interest that is subject to execution prior
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     to its going forward.
                 So again, Mr. Tilt, I'm going to ask that you
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     prepare documentation consistent with the ruling.
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                 MR. TILT:
                           Thank you.
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                 THE COURT: All right.
                Are there any questions, Mr. Tilt, that you have
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     regarding the Court's ruling today in connection with that
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     assignment to make the preparation?
                MR. TILT: I don't think so. No.
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                                                    Thank you.
                 THE COURT: All right.
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                Mr. Johnson, any question regarding the ruling of
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     the Court today?
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                MR. JOHNSON: No specific question on the ruling.
     Procedurally, I don't know if the Court can offer any direction
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     on where the Court would like these legal issues to be
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     determined, in the prior action, or what we call the second
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     lawsuit in our briefing, or in a new matter, this case.
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     Where -- where does -- where does the Court want these legal
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     issues determined? Is that perhaps the subject of the
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    briefing?
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                THE COURT:
                            And I suppose the best answer I can
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     give to that question is I can't be your attorney, counsel.
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have to deal with what's before me. And I can only resolve

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disputes that are presented to me.

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There are now two cases. Are there arguments that could be raised that one should be continued and another dismissed or they ought to be consolidated? Those are certain -- certainly appropriate questions for legal determination. But they are not before the Court today.

I'm not addressing motions in either of those cases today, other than the question of the enforceability of the writ of execution. That, I have ruled on. But I've made no rulings on any other issues in other cases.

I've had some commentary on those cases. That's intended simply to inform the parties, in an effort to avoid unnecessary consumption of either legal resources or judicial resources, in matters that may or may not be appropriate for further consideration.

But the determination strategically as to how those matters should proceed, or if they should proceed, has to be left to counsel. And I'm not -- I'm not in a position to provide legal advice on either side on those questions. And that probably was an inadequate answer, but that's probably as far as I can go.

MR. JOHNSON: Understood.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Johnson?

MR. JOHNSON: No, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

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I will make one other aside. And that is, with respect to Metro National Title, I don't know whether you were involved at the time of the Utah Title dissolution and Metro Title's acquisition of various interests, I think, that were handled by Mr. Newman at that time, but that name, as it came back up, just sparked several memories, as -- as I was involved as the trustee in the Utah Title case. That just goes back a lot of years, and it was just interesting to hear that name coming back up again. So anyway, thank you all very much. And I appreciate the diligence and effort of the parties and the presentation. Certainly these are unique issues. And as even I've looked at the briefing, many of them have not been definitely determined here in Utah. The issue of the Supreme Court kind of established new law in the State of Utah, and we are at the point of addressing its impact. And certainly I appreciate the excellent work of competent counsel in presenting those questions. So thank you. And we are in recess until the Court's afternoon calendar. Thank you. (Proceedings concluded.)

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1	STATE OF UTAH)					
2	COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)					
3	I, CECILEE WILSON, Certified Shorthand					
4	Reporter for the State of Utah, certify:					
5	That I received the audio recording in this					
6	matter, that I transcribed it into typewriting, and that a					
7	full, true, and correct transcription of said audio recording					
8	so recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages					
9	inclusive, except where it is indicated that the recording was					
10	inaudible.					
11	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am neither counsel					
12	for nor related to any party to said action nor in anywise					
13	interested in the outcome thereof.					
14	Certified and dated this 17th day of February,					
15	2025.					
16						
17	Ciècilee Wilson					
18	CECILEE WILSON, CSR, RDR, CRR Certified Shorthand Reporter					
19	for the State of Utah					
20						
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22						
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Document 24-1 83 of 96

	\$ \$1,775,000 [1] - 20:13 \$1,775,896.73 [2] - 20:7, 45:19	19 [1] - 33:7 1978 [1] - 33:11 1980 [5] - 33:11, 34:8, 34:10, 49:21 1984 [3] - 32:10,	22:9, 22:21, 30:12, 30:17, 30:22, 36:10, 49:15, 51:11, 51:12, 52:16 5-11-2021 [1] - 50:1	58:22, 62:10 absence [1] - 68:12 absolutely [1] - 58:5 abstract [16] - 25:2, 25:6, 25:14, 25:16,	admissibility [1] - 26:21 admission [13] - 15:10, 17:11, 18:25, 19:14, 21:3, 22:12,
	\$1.75 [2] - 51:8, 52:3 \$712,000 [2] - 20:21, 51:9 \$948,000 [2] - 20:25,	32:12, 33:5 1994 _[2] - 32:11, 32:12	5-7-505 [1] - 40:5 50 [2] - 50:21, 73:14 53 [1] - 6:10	26:4, 26:7, 26:25, 27:15, 29:3, 29:19, 42:19, 42:22, 43:6, 49:17, 49:19, 50:5	23:1, 24:6, 25:18, 26:10, 28:7, 28:20, 46:22 admitted [1] - 27:21
1	51:10		6	abstracted [2] - 25:1,	advantage [1] - 62:6
	'21 [2] - 52:20, 52:21 '78 [1] - 33:12 '81 [1] - 33:12	2 [6] - 27:25, 28:7, 28:11, 28:12, 49:8, 61:21 2002 [1] - 49:10 2007 [3] - 28:4, 49:10, 49:14 2011 [2] - 54:20, 55:1	6 [9] - 23:8, 24:7, 24:8, 24:10, 24:11, 24:14, 30:22, 37:3, 49:21 65 [4] - 64:15, 64:20, 69:12, 69:16 65A [3] - 57:10, 57:17,	44:1 abstracting [3] - 33:16, 33:23, 34:1 abstractor [1] - 33:13 abstracts [2] - 41:15, 43:8 abundantly [1] - 63:7	adverse [1] - 58:4 advice [1] - 80:19 affairs [1] - 12:13 affect [2] - 36:11 affects [1] - 71:1 affirming [1] - 61:25 afforded [1] - 57:10
ſ	1	2017 [1] - 30:11	57:23 66 [3] - 64:15, 64:16,	accepted [3] - 43:20,	afternoon [1] - 81:21
I	1 _[68] - 15:22, 16:13, 16:15, 16:19, 16:21, 16:22, 16:23, 16:25,	2020 [4] - 30:12, 30:14, 52:15, 61:10 2021 [3] - 49:23, 61:10, 68:7	69:11 694 [1] - 10:7	55:15, 78:15 accident [1] - 10:1 accord [1] - 50:9 account [2] - 20:21,	agent [1] - 14:19 agreement [1] - 17:22 ahead [1] - 9:22
١	17:2, 17:3, 17:11,	2024 [5] - 5:17, 6:22,	7	52:2	al [1] - 25:8 alike," [1] - 10:5
	17:13, 17:15, 17:16, 18:7, 18:25, 19:5, 19:6, 19:14, 19:19, 19:21, 21:5, 21:9, 21:11, 22:2, 22:8, 22:9, 22:12, 22:17, 22:21, 23:6, 23:7, 24:7, 24:11, 24:13, 25:19, 25:25, 26:2, 26:10, 27:23, 27:24, 28:12, 28:14, 28:25, 29:11, 30:10, 30:12, 30:13, 30:22, 37:3, 39:13, 39:14, 39:15, 47:5, 48:24, 50:1, 50:2, 50:20, 51:10, 51:15	7:4, 7:5, 48:19 2025 [1] - 4:1 210904774 [1] - 5:17 21:9, 22:8, 22:17, 23:7, 24:13, 5, 26:2, 3, 27:24, 4, 28:25, 3, 30:12, 3, 37:3, 4, 39:15, 50:1, 51:10, 2025 [1] - 4:1 210904774 [1] - 5:17 21st [3] - 48:1, 54:3, 54:5 240908957 [1] - 4:5 25 [2] - 49:23, 50:20 258 [3] - 54:19, 54:23, 54:24 26 [3] - 5:17, 48:19 281 [2] - 54:19, 54:24 3 3 3 3 [11] - 28:13, 28:20, 28:22, 28:24, 28:25,	7 [18] - 6:6, 8:5, 24:13, 24:15, 25:19, 25:24, 25:25, 29:10, 29:11, 29:15, 29:20, 30:13, 52:15, 66:2, 68:16, 70:22 75-7-505 [2] - 39:4, 60:1 75-7-505 (1 [5] - 9:7, 9:13, 48:6, 53:14, 58:7 75-7-505 (1) [1] - 10:11 78B-3-301 (1) [1] - 70:6	accurate [1] - 27:15 acknowledged [2] - 67:1, 71:9 acquired [1] - 28:5 acquisition [1] - 81:4 act [1] - 17:22 acted [1] - 14:19 action [25] - 7:18, 8:13, 8:16, 8:23, 9:2, 62:21, 63:8, 63:17, 63:21, 64:15, 64:17, 64:20, 64:22, 65:13, 69:8, 69:9, 69:14, 69:15, 70:5, 71:24, 72:20, 77:12, 77:25,	all," [1] - 64:18 alleged [1] - 35:19 allow [5] - 52:2, 52:11, 52:25, 53:5, 58:12 allowance [1] - 74:2 allowed [4] - 11:9, 50:25, 59:17, 61:12 allowing [2] - 56:24, 61:17 Alum [76] - 4:5, 4:10, 5:15, 5:19, 5:22, 5:24, 6:7, 6:16, 7:3, 7:5, 7:13, 7:19, 8:13, 8:14, 9:8, 9:20, 9:23, 9:25, 10:20, 11:6, 25:7, 30:13, 30:17,
	51:11, 51:12, 52:15 10 [6] - 15:11, 15:14, 16:22, 16:23, 50:2 100 [1] - 73:17 1031 [1] - 10:7 1036 [1] - 10:7	49:2, 49:12, 59:1, 59:7, 61:24, 67:9 30/60 [1] - 73:15 30/70 [2] - 73:15 3066407 [2] - 22:8, 22:9	8 [11] - 5:5, 14:21, 19:21, 21:3, 21:5, 21:6, 21:8, 21:9, 45:11, 51:13	actions [3] - 63:20, 66:19, 73:24 actions" [1] - 70:3 actual [4] - 5:11, 32:22, 32:23, 53:24	30:23, 36:12, 41:3, 48:1, 50:11, 50:16, 51:6, 51:20, 51:24, 52:1, 52:12, 52:14, 52:17, 52:21, 53:8,
1	11 [8] - 21:2, 21:11, 22:8, 22:12, 22:16,		9	additional [4] - 46:20, 61:1, 62:24, 66:12	53:12, 53:15, 53:17, 53:25, 54:5, 54:6,
	22:17, 60:18 12 [5] - 22:18, 23:1, 23:3, 23:5, 23:6 13 [6] - 46:22, 47:1, 47:4, 47:5, 52:23, 53:23 14 [8] - 4:1, 31:6, 46:22, 47:1, 47:4, 47:5, 53:24, 54:1 15 [5] - 46:22, 47:1, 47:4, 47:4, 47:5, 58:24 17 [1] - 31:23 18 [1] - 7:5	4 4 [15] - 6:5, 19:7, 19:14, 19:18, 19:19, 22:22, 30:10, 30:17, 36:10, 49:15, 51:10, 52:16, 59:1 40 [1] - 73:14 4th [1] - 6:21 5 5 [15] - 18:7, 18:25, 19:4, 19:5, 22:2,	9 [8] - 5:6, 26:2, 26:10, 27:23, 29:3, 29:19, 49:17, 50:1 90 [1] - 73:15 90/10 [1] - 73:16 902 [1] - 5:7 9th [1] - 7:4 A ability [3] - 50:16, 65:7, 65:15 able [4] - 6:18, 11:7,	address [2] - 13:4, 77:8 addressed [3] - 68:16, 68:17, 71:20 addresses [2] - 35:13, 35:16 addressing [2] - 80:7, 81:17 administer [2] - 31:13, 31:15 administered [1] - 31:25 administration [1] - 32:14	55:11, 55:13, 55:24, 56:25, 57:25, 58:7, 58:10, 58:18, 58:22, 59:14, 59:25, 61:17, 63:18, 65:5, 65:10, 65:13, 65:19, 66:3, 66:5, 67:10, 67:21, 75:7, 75:8, 76:5, 76:7, 76:12, 78:24 American [5] - 31:22, 32:7, 32:8, 32:10, 33:9 amount [1] - 20:7 analysis [1] - 32:3

borrowers [1] - 19:10

Case 1:25-cv-00008-DAK-CMR

54:19, 55:1 ascertainment [1] -48:3 aside [1] - 81:1 assert [1] - 10:10 asserted [2] - 35:19, 56:12 asserting [4] - 56:12, 56:14, 56:18, 65:19 assignment [1] -79:10 Associate [1] - 33:22 Associated [2] - 33:7, 33:9 assumption [1] -18:24 attach [3] - 8:20, 9:9, 9:13 attached [3] - 8:19, 68:2, 74:11 attaches [4] - 8:6, 8:7, 69:3, 69:5 attachment [1] - 68:11 attack [2] - 62:3, 65:22 attackable [1] - 63:11 attacked [1] - 7:10 attacking [5] - 8:3, 8:18, 8:19, 64:4 attempt [5] - 44:10, 62:16, 65:1, 65:2, 65:10 attempting [1] - 55:13 attorney [1] - 79:24 audio [1] - 6:21 authentication [1] -5:7 authority [6] - 17:22, 64:13, 69:19, 69:23, 71:7. 73:2 authorization [1] -21:22 available [3] - 59:4, 67:15, 67:21 avoid [3] - 12:12, 75:20, 80:12 await [1] - 78:3 aware [5] - 26:15, 39:10, 55:20, 76:4, 78:16 Axos [5] - 20:14, 20:20, 20:21, 29:24,

В

51:9

background [2] -7:24, 11:3 balance [1] - 58:1 Bank [6] - 19:11, 20:14, 20:20, 20:21,

49:21, 51:10 Bar [1] - 34:5 bar [1] - 34:13 barred [1] - 34:7 Based [2] - 30:8, 44:19 based [6] - 4:14, 14:12, 45:2, 72:12, 74:20, 77:15 bases [1] - 63:10 Basinview [2] - 49:8, 49:11 basis [7] - 5:15, 27:8, 27:21, 34:24, 54:2, 66:24, 72:8 Bates [2] - 27:6 Bay [8] - 18:21, 20:17, 20:25, 21:20, 21:22, 22:1, 30:11, 51:12 because." [1] - 59:2 become [3] - 34:7, 43:12, 43:24 beginning [1] - 70:14 behind [1] - 43:9 believes [2] - 70:16, 74:19 belongs [1] - 73:14 Ben [1] - 4:10 bench [1] - 4:17 beneficiary [2] -18:15, 18:22 best [2] - 18:5, 79:23 better [1] - 7:12 between [10] - 11:11, 11:17, 18:12, 19:8, 28:15, 28:16, 30:2, 65:4, 65:5, 69:14 beyond [2] - 34:13, 66:17 BFPs [1] - 11:23 biggest [1] - 12:3 binder [16] - 4:19, 10:17, 14:21, 14:23, 15:14, 15:21, 15:23, 16:3, 16:4, 16:12, 16:18, 17:1, 17:4, 19:7, 38:13, 52:23 binding [5] - 35:18, 35:24, 36:17, 40:12, 43:21 bit [3] - 12:6, 47:18, 68:25 bite [1] - 65:2 Blake [3] - 13:17, 13:18, 14:9 BLAKE [1] - 14:1 BOFI [3] - 19:10, 30:9 bond [5] - 76:5, 76:8, 76:13, 76:17, 76:24

bought [1] - 50:8 Box [5] - 5:16, 5:20, 7:20, 65:10, 66:2 Bradley [1] - 4:7 Brett [71] - 6:13, 7:15, 9:10, 11:12, 11:13, 11:14, 11:17, 17:20, 17:22, 18:13, 19:9, 25:3, 25:11, 28:4, 28:16, 28:18, 29:5, 29:8, 30:2, 37:25, 38:15, 38:18, 38:20, 38:23, 39:10, 39:18, 39:19, 40:2, 40:6, 40:22, 41:12, 41:19, 41:22, 41:24, 42:10, 44:11, 44:18, 48:17, 48:21, 49:2, 49:5, 49:9, 50:5, 50:7, 50:9, 50:17, 50:23, 50:24, 51:1, 51:2, 51:5, 53:2, 53:18, 56:5, 56:20, 58:8, 59:5, 59:8, 59:21, 65:5, 67:16, 68:23, 70:20, 74:9, 74:12, 74:15, 74:25, 75:18, 75:23 Brett's [5] - 9:13, 53:16, 56:8, 57:14, 66:7 brief [6] - 5:2, 12:5, 53:11, 60:18, 61:21, 77.2 briefed [2] - 58:25, 60:4 briefing [9] - 7:10, 9:4, 10:7, 27:4, 27:7, 62:4, 79:19, 79:22, 81:13 Briefly [1] - 63:3 briefs [2] - 53:12, 53:20 bring [9] - 5:22, 61:9, 61:14, 64:1, 64:2, 64:24, 65:8, 65:9, 65:10 bringing [1] - 61:11 brings [2] - 5:14, 7:24 brought [11] - 7:19, 60:8, 60:17, 61:3, 61:4, 62:18, 63:23, 64:2, 65:8 burden [7] - 53:12, 53:17, 53:22, 54:9, 54:11, 58:7, 66:6

27:13, 27:17, 27:18 buy [2] - 55:4, 55:12 buyer [1] - 74:16 buyers [1] - 30:4 BY [2] - 14:6, 37:2

C

calendar [1] - 81:21 California [8] - 10:23, 19:11, 65:5, 72:4, 72:6, 72:7, 72:13 cancelled [1] - 62:13 cannot [3] - 50:24, 53:9, 77:6 capacity [8] - 31:7, 31:10, 31:24, 31:25, 40:6, 40:23, 41:13, 41:25 Capital [4] - 20:17, 21:20, 21:22, 51:13 caption [1] - 24:16 care [1] - 12:12 case [67] - 4:15, 5:16, 5:18, 5:20, 5:22, 6:7, 7:20, 7:22, 8:2, 8:8, 8:10, 8:13, 8:14, 8:17, 8:22, 10:6, 10:14, 12:6, 14:15, 18:4, 48:4, 48:15, 50:14, 50:15, 50:18, 53:21, 54:10, 54:16, 54:18, 54:20, 55:2, 55:4, 55:11, 55:15, 56:13, 56:15, 56:24, 57:6, 57:13, 57:18, 58:2, 58:5, 58:13, 60:15, 63:19, 63:24, 65:3, 65:9, 65:10, 65:15, 65:16, 66:2, 66:3, 68:16, 70:13, 71:3, 76:6, 76:8, 77:10, 77:12, 77:15, 78:11, 79:19, 81:7 Case [1] - 5:17 cases [4] - 80:2, 80:7, 80:10, 80:11 Cases [1] - 4:5 cases." [1] - 12:17 cash [5] - 46:3, 51:8, 55:4, 55:12, 58:1 caught [1] - 33:18 causes [5] - 70:4, 70:7, 70:15, 70:17, 71:11 cautionary [1] - 77:13 certain [4] - 41:7, 41:9, 70:3, 80:5 certainly [11] - 35:17, 57:5, 57:7, 58:1,

book [1] - 22:2

Burningham [1] -

business [5] - 27:10,

60:15

se 1:25-cv-00008-DAK-CMR

co-settlors [1] - 71:17 co-trustees [1] - 39:19 Code [2] - 39:4, 40:4 collateral [2] - 62:3, 65:22 collaterally [1] - 64:4 collecting [1] - 58:1 combine [1] - 5:19 coming [1] - 81:9 comity [5] - 12:5, 12:10, 12:15, 12:22, 60:13 commentary [1] -80:11 commitments [1] -32:19 community [1] - 48:25 company [3] - 31:15, 33:24, 55:5 Company [6] - 14:12, 31:23, 32:9, 33:7, 33:9, 33:10 competent [1] - 81:18 complaint [1] - 5:21 compliance [4] - 8:20, 63:13, 63:14, 64:8 complicated [1] - 6:25 composite [1] - 68:1 con [2] - 40:12, 49:7 concede [1] - 56:6 concerning [1] - 19:23 conclude [1] - 46:9 concluded [1] - 81:22 conclusion [8] -35:19, 35:20, 39:23, 40:8, 40:10, 43:14, 43:21, 44:21 conduct [4] - 23:17, 37:15, 37:17, 55:13 conducted [5] - 37:4, 37:8, 37:13, 42:15, 45:4 conducting [1] - 26:20 confused [1] - 44:16 confusing [1] - 74:7 confusion [1] - 75:20 connection [13] -17:9, 23:18, 23:23, 24:20, 26:8, 29:1, 32:1, 45:15, 49:19, 56:13, 64:3, 77:7, consider [1] - 4:12 consideration [2] -67:19, 80:15 considerations [1] -12:15 considered [4] -

considers [1] - 35:17 consistent [2] - 77:2, 79:5 consolidated [1] -80:4 constitute [3] - 35:25, 36:16, 40:13 constructive [1] -11:24 consult [1] - 31:11 consumption [1] -80:13 contacted [1] - 62:9 contained [1] - 38:4 containing [1] - 38:7 contains [2] - 19:23, 76:2 contention [1] - 53:14 contents [1] - 15:17 continue [2] - 59:11. 70:1 continued [1] - 80:3 continues [1] - 58:18 contract [1] - 30:2 contrary [1] - 49:7 contrast [1] - 53:5 contribute [2] - 50:8, 50:9 contributed [2] -50:18, 51:4 contribution [13] -7:14, 9:10, 10:10, 48:12, 48:21, 50:13, 50:23, 50:24, 53:16, 53:18, 57:15, 58:8, 66:7 contributions [1] -71:19 control [1] - 59:5 convey [1] - 17:23 conveyance [1] - 29:7 conveyances [1] -49:20 conveyed [6] - 9:11, 15:6, 49:8, 49:11, 52:6, 75:10 conveys [1] - 49:13 cooperate [1] - 47:22 coordinate [1] - 60:19 copies [6] - 5:6, 41:15, 46:23, 46:25, 47:2, 54:17 copy [11] - 17:8, 17:18, 17:21, 17:25, 18:6, 18:12, 19:22, 26:3, 28:3, 28:16, 54:16 corner [1] - 18:20 correct [16] - 20:23, 20:25, 22:3, 22:10,

23:16, 24:17, 24:22, 37:7, 39:22, 42:15, 42:16, 42:20, 44:4, 44:9, 44:18, 63:16 Correct [4] - 15:9, 21:1, 45:10, 46:4 correctly [4] - 37:6, 38:22, 66:18, 67:1 Counsel [8] - 4:6, 7:10, 8:9, 10:17, 53:20, 63:4, 65:1, 65:9 counsel [29] - 4:11, 4:21, 5:1, 6:16, 10:15, 13:4, 14:11, 14:12, 15:16, 15:18, 16:13, 16:19, 16:24, 27:4, 31:8, 31:22, 32:12, 47:19, 48:5, 48:9, 58:14, 62:25, 65:12, 65:20, 66:13, 69:11, 79:24, 80:18, 81:18 counsel's [1] - 47:16 County [10] - 9:1, 23:19, 25:7, 26:3, 26:25, 37:23, 62:9, 69:24, 72:10, 73:14 county [20] - 23:21, 23:25, 24:3, 24:15, 27:12, 27:15, 42:22, 42:24, 43:6, 43:25, 44:2, 44:3, 63:21, 67:11, 69:20, 70:5, 71:13, 72:9, 75:12 couple [5] - 4:22, 15:4, 24:24, 63:4, 77:13 course [3] - 18:1, 54:14, 58:13 court [26] - 6:11, 7:4, 8:25, 10:21, 12:6, 12:7, 12:8, 23:18, 23:25, 24:4, 44:23, 47:2, 55:7, 55:19, 55:20, 55:23, 56:10, 60:16, 60:17, 63:19, 71:7, 73:22, 73:24, 76:15, 77:24 COURT [86] - 4:4, 4:9, 4:11, 4:18, 4:23, 4:25, 5:3, 5:9, 10:15, 12:25, 13:2, 13:10, 13:12, 13:14, 13:16, 13:18, 13:21, 13:24, 15:12, 15:14, 15:18, 16:1, 16:7, 16:10, 16:12, 16:17, 16:24, 17:2, 17:13, 17:15, 19:2, 19:4, 19:16,

19:18, 21:4, 21:6, 21:8, 22:14, 22:16, 23:3, 23:5, 24:8, 24:10, 25:20, 25:22, 25:24, 26:12, 26:17, 26:22, 27:2, 27:9, 28:9. 28:11. 28:22. 28:24, 31:3, 34:20, 34:25, 36:15, 36:21, 39:14, 39:24, 40:9, 43:17, 46:7, 46:9, 46:14, 46:16, 46:18, 47:1, 47:4, 47:8, 47:13, 54:21, 54:23, 54:25, 58:14, 58:16, 62:24, 63:2, 66:12, 79:7, 79:12, 79:23, 80:23, 80:25 Court [146] - 4:19, 6:3, 6:5, 6:9, 8:4, 8:11, 8:14, 8:25, 10:9, 10:12, 10:22, 11:2, 12:2, 12:4, 12:19, 12:20, 12:21, 12:23, 13:8, 27:9, 34:25, 35:1, 35:9, 35:10, 35:14, 35:17, 35:18, 35:23, 35:24, 35:25, 36:17, 36:18, 43:21, 45:9, 48:20, 49:4, 50:7, 53:23, 53:25, 54:19, 55:1, 55:15, 58:12, 58:20, 59:1, 59:20, 60:5, 60:11, 60:21, 60:24, 60:25, 61:3, 61:15, 61:16, 61:19, 61:24, 62:1, 62:8, 62:22, 63:7, 63:16, 63:19, 64:7, 64:11, 64:12, 64:14, 64:17, 65:17, 65:18, 66:2, 66:11, 66:14, 66:17, 67:3, 67:5, 67:6, 67:8, 67:20, 68:4, 68:5, 68:14, 68:21, 69:10, 69:23, 70:7, 70:13, 70:16, 70:19, 70:21, 71:9, 71:15, 71:22, 72:1, 72:11, 72:12, 72:14, 72:16, 72:18, 72:19, 72:21, 73:1, 73:4, 73:7, 73:8, 73:10, 73:20, 73:23, 74:3, 74:14, 74:19, 74:22, 74:24, 75:3, 75:16, 75:21, 75:25, 76:7, 76:9, 76:20, 76:21, 76:23, 77:3, 77:10, 77:11, 77:15, 77:16, 77:21, 78:4, 78:7,

35:22, 57:20, 68:4,

78:14

20:12, 45:14

Case 1:25-cv-00008-DAK-CMR

D

Dal [1] - 11:17 damage [1] - 76:18 date [2] - 49:25, 50:2 dated [2] - 28:4, 30:22 dating [1] - 49:20 days [1] - 33:8 deal [2] - 5:9, 79:25 deals [1] - 54:20 dealt [3] - 63:12, 64:6, 64:7 debt [2] - 56:12, 56:19 debtor [5] - 9:10, 48:13, 48:14, 48:15, 59:5 debtors [1] - 25:9 debts [2] - 56:20, 56:21 December [3] - 6:21, 7:4, 7:5 decide [1] - 60:23 decided [6] - 7:13,

67:4, 67:5, 67:20, 68:9 decision [6] - 34:1, 61:20, 61:24, 61:25, 62:3, 69:10 decisions [1] - 32:17 declaratory [1] - 63:25 decline [2] - 12:22, 62:1 declined [2] - 70:21, 73:4 declines [2] - 35:9, 76:7 declining [1] - 76:14 deed [28] - 15:3, 18:12, 18:18, 18:23, 19:8, 19:11, 21:16, 21:17, 21:18, 21:20, 21:23, 22:2, 22:20, 22:21, 22:25, 28:3, 28:15, 28:16, 29:4, 30:10, 30:11, 49:12, 49:22, 50:3, 51:10, 51:11, 51:13, 75:9 deeds [9] - 30:16, 30:21, 36:10, 49:15, 52:16, 52:20, 53:7, 56:20, 57:1 defective [1] - 34:2 define [1] - 79:2 defined [1] - 74:9 definitely [2] - 56:13, 81:14 Del [83] - 6:13, 9:10, 11:12, 11:13, 11:14, 11:17, 15:3, 15:5, 15:6, 17:8, 17:18, 17:20, 17:21, 17:25, 18:13, 19:9, 19:13, 19:25, 23:19, 24:20, 25:3, 25:11, 25:15, 26:8, 28:4, 28:5, 28:17, 28:18, 29:5, 29:8, 29:15, 29:17, 30:3, 37:25, 38:1, 38:15, 38:18, 38:20, 38:23, 39:10, 39:18, 40:2, 40:6, 40:22, 40:25, 41:5, 41:12, 41:19, 41:22, 41:24, 42:10, 44:11, 44:13, 44:18, 48:17, 48:21, 49:5, 49:9, 50:6, 50:7, 50:9, 56:20,

denies [1] - 34:25 Department [1] - 10:6 department [2] -37:10, 42:4 deposited [1] - 20:13 deposition [1] - 47:21 described [2] - 27:19, 31:19 description [2] -29:13, 78:19 designated [1] - 39:18 detail [1] - 7:19 detailed [1] - 6:25 determination [28] -27:16, 35:25, 36:17, 40:13, 66:4, 68:21, 70:9, 70:16, 70:17, 71:5, 71:11, 71:12, 71:20, 72:1, 72:25, 73:5, 73:9, 73:18, 73:21, 76:9, 77:2, 77:6, 77:9, 78:5, 78:14, 78:25, 80:6, 80:16 determinations [2] -67:7, 75:3 determine [11] -35:14, 42:7, 68:14, 69:9, 69:15, 71:16, 71:17, 73:16, 73:20, 77:20, 78:4 determined [9] -67:12, 68:13, 72:21, 74:4, 74:14, 75:5, 79:18, 79:21, 81:14 determines [3] -35:15, 35:23, 36:18 determining [3] -32:24, 36:7, 71:2 Development [1] -49:8 dictates [1] - 60:18 different [5] - 9:2, 15:5, 16:14, 65:18, 75:10 differently [1] - 68:25 diligence [1] - 81:11 **DIRECT** [1] - 14:5 direct [1] - 18:19 directed [1] - 6:14 directing [1] - 21:22 direction [2] - 10:18, 79:16 directly [2] - 49:11, 66:17 disbarred [1] - 34:9 disbursement [2] -20:20, 20:24 disbursements [5] -19:23, 20:1, 20:9,

disclose [2] - 30:7, 44:14 discloses [1] - 42:12 discovered [1] - 43:2 discovery [1] - 54:13 discuss [1] - 47:22 discussed [1] - 57:12 discussing [1] - 61:22 discussion [4] -68:15, 69:12, 69:13, 71:23 disingenuous [1] -65:18 dismiss [1] - 77:25 dismissed [1] - 80:4 dispute [4] - 67:12, 67:19, 69:25, 75:5 disputes [1] - 80:1 dissolution [1] - 81:3 distinction [3] - 11:11, 11:16, 69:14 distracted [1] - 10:18 District [34] - 8:25, 10:22, 11:2, 12:2, 12:19, 12:20, 12:23, 46:23, 53:25, 58:20, 58:25, 60:5, 60:12, 60:23, 60:24, 61:3, 61:7, 61:15, 61:16, 62:3, 63:12, 69:23, 71:15, 71:20, 72:8, 72:12, 72:14, 72:16, 72:18, 72:19, 73:1, 73:11, 73:12, 73:20 district [6] - 12:6, 12:11, 60:16, 60:17, 67:24, 69:19 district." [1] - 69:21 doctrine [6] - 9:21, 9:24, 51:18, 51:19, 55:20, 55:24 document [23] -14:25, 17:7, 18:9, 19:7, 20:11, 21:13, 21:20, 22:19, 23:8, 23:10, 24:14, 24:15, 26:2, 26:14, 27:25, 28:14, 29:13, 30:13, 41:17, 41:20, 41:21, 45:12, 49:8 documentation [5] -38:4, 38:6, 38:7, 44:19, 79:5 documents [13] -5:10, 15:23, 16:2, 16:14, 16:20, 32:24, 32:25, 33:15, 34:2, 34:18, 41:14, 44:24, 46:23

domesticated [1] -10:24 domestication [1] -65:4 done [10] - 32:24, 38:19, 40:5, 40:25, 42:6, 42:13, 43:3, 56:23, 65:20, 72:13 down [1] - 46:11 due [3] - 54:14, 55:25, 58:13 duly [1] - 14:2 during [3] - 6:17, 6:20, 23:12 During [1] - 32:12 duties [3] - 31:10, 31:24, 32:16

E eerily [1] - 55:3 effect [8] - 32:25, 33:1, 34:18, 36:6, 36:7, 40:4, 68:18, 76:19 effective [1] - 51:1 effectively [1] - 35:1 effectuated [1] - 69:20 effort [2] - 80:12, 81:11 either [9] - 41:1, 41:5, 68:10, 71:18, 75:18, 75:23, 80:7, 80:13, 80:19 element [3] - 57:17, 57:23, 58:3 elements [3] - 56:11, 57:9, 58:11 elevated [4] - 9:25, 51:21, 55:25, 57:1 elicited [1] - 35:11 ellipsis [1] - 63:22 Emerald [9] - 18:21, 20:17, 20:25, 21:20, 21:22, 22:1, 29:24, 30:11, 51:12 employed [3] - 33:7, 33:9, 33:10 employment[2] -32:6, 33:5 encumbered [1] -19:12 encumbering [1] -18:17 encumbers [2] -49:16, 76:10 encumbrances [6] -30:4, 30:7, 30:22,

51:15, 51:23, 53:1

end [5] - 5:18, 6:9,

59:5, 59:8, 59:22,

65:5, 68:22, 68:23,

70:20, 74:9, 74:12,

delivered [1] - 20:6

75.23

74:15, 74:25, 75:18,

Case 1:25-cv-00008-DAK-CMR

24:6, 25:18, 26:11, 28:8, 28:21, 46:20, 46:22, 48:16, 48:18, 48:20, 49:4, 50:7, 50:14, 57:8, 66:16 evidentiary [1] - 47:10 exact [2] - 37:10, 53:8 exactly [2] - 10:5, 52:24 **EXAMINATION**[2] -14:5, 37:1 examination [3] -36:6, 36:22, 37:10 examined [1] - 14:3 examining [1] - 32:24 **Examining** [1] - 33:15 example [2] - 72:5, 75:9 exceed [1] - 48:12 excellent [1] - 81:18 except [2] - 5:5, 24:15 Except [1] - 27:3 exception [1] - 27:10 Exchange [1] - 31:16 exclusive [1] - 8:24 excoriated [2] - 8:12, 64:14 Excuse [3] - 22:21, 23:4, 39:15 excuse [5] - 26:4, 51:12, 53:11, 57:5, 61:17 excused [3] - 46:13, 46:15, 46:19 execute [3] - 75:7, 75:13, 75:15 execution [57] - 5:23, 5:25, 6:14, 9:8, 11:7, 11:9, 11:16, 12:20, 51:1, 52:22, 52:23, 53:24, 54:2, 57:16, 58:22, 58:23, 59:2, 59:4, 59:15, 59:16, 60:1, 61:2, 61:12, 61:18, 62:7, 62:10, 63:14, 64:21, 66:21, 66:24, 66:25, 67:2, 69:15, 69:20, 71:8, 71:25, 72:1, 72:11, 74:5, 74:7, 74:8, 74:12, 74:13, 74:15, 75:4, 75:12, 75:20, 75:21, 76:22, 77:8, 78:19, 78:22, 78:23, 79:2, 80:9 executions [2] -66:19, 66:20 exempt [1] - 66:23 exercise [2] - 12:12,

62:1

Exhibit [83] - 14:21, 15:11, 15:22, 16:13, 16:23, 16:25, 17:4, 17:11, 17:16, 18:7, 18:25, 19:5, 19:6, 19:14, 19:19, 19:21, 21:2, 21:3, 21:5, 21:9, 21:11, 22:2, 22:8, 22:9, 22:12, 22:17, 22:21, 23:1, 23:6, 23:7, 24:7, 24:11, 24:12, 24:13, 25:19, 25:25, 26:1, 26:10, 27:23, 27:24, 28:7, 28:12, 28:14, 28:20, 28:25, 29:3, 29:10, 29:11, 29:15, 29:19, 30:10, 30:12, 30:22, 37:3, 39:13, 39:15, 47:5, 48:23, 49:8, 49:12, 49:17, 50:1, 50:2, 51:10, 51:11, 51:12, 51:13, 52:14, 52:15, 52:16, 52:23, 53:23, 53:24, 54:1, 58:24, 61:21, 61:24 exhibit [2] - 15:22, 16:17 exhibits [10] - 4:20, 5:5, 15:15, 15:19, 16:5, 16:10, 38:8, 38:13, 66:16 Exhibits [4] - 30:16, 36:10, 46:22, 49:15 exists [2] - 67:22 expectation [1] -44:14 expects [2] - 77:16, 78:12 expedited [2] - 5:15, 47:19 **experience** [1] - 35:7 experienced [1] - 36:6 expert [4] - 34:17, 34:22, 35:1, 35:10 expertise [2] - 40:10, 40:15 Expertise [1] - 43:19 experts [1] - 35:2 **explaining** [1] - 55:17 express [5] - 35:21, 36:2, 40:15, 68:19. 73:3 expressed [5] - 35:6, 35:15, 35:21, 40:12 expressing [1] - 70:23 expression [6] - 35:7, 35:11, 36:16, 40:14, 43:20, 43:22

expressly [1] - 76:21
extend [3] - 6:1,
66:16, 74:25
extent [18] - 7:15,
9:10, 35:13, 40:9,
48:21, 50:13, 50:17,
50:19, 50:24, 53:16,
54:6, 58:9, 66:4,
66:8, 68:22, 69:2,
76:22, 77:5

face [2] - 56:19, 78:15 fact [8] - 9:5, 11:12, 27:3, 48:23, 49:7, 57:15, 63:6, 69:16 factored [1] - 55:21 facts [3] - 55:2, 56:10, 61:14 failed [1] - 61:14 fair [3] - 18:24, 20:22, 23:15 false [1] - 8:10 familiar [1] - 39:4 family [1] - 49:9 Family [22] - 15:6, 17:8, 17:18, 17:21, 17:25, 18:13, 19:9, 19:25, 23:19, 24:21, 25:15, 28:5, 28:17, 28:18, 29:5, 29:8, 29:16, 29:17, 30:3, 38:1, 38:20, 56:21 far [7] - 26:15, 33:8, 50:14, 74:6, 78:18, 80:21 fault [1] - 43:3 favor [2] - 18:14, 58:2 February [1] - 49:23 Federal [1] - 19:10 federal [5] - 12:6, 12:9, 12:11, 12:14, 12:15 fee [1] - 74:17 felt [1] - 65:17 few [1] - 64:19 file [15] - 7:17, 7:20, 7:22, 26:7, 26:19, 38:5, 42:12, 44:19, 45:2, 45:8, 45:9, 47:17, 65:16 filed [7] - 6:11, 6:17, 7:4, 37:25, 61:5, 62:20, 65:13 files [4] - 27:13, 41:16, 52:22 filing [1] - 8:18 filings [1] - 73:24 final [5] - 58:3, 61:16,

61:17, 61:18, 67:13 finally [1] - 62:10 findable [2] - 56:7, 56:9 firmly [1] - 8:11 First [6] - 5:4, 31:22, 32:7, 32:8, 32:10, 33:9 first [12] - 14:2, 18:15, 20:14, 23:10, 29:12, 34:7, 45:25, 49:22, 49:25, 65:2, 70:1, fits [1] - 27:10 five [1] - 75:10 flatly [1] - 8:10 focus [3] - 68:15, 70:15, 71:23 folks [1] - 55:16 folks' [1] - 58:7 follow [2] - 16:19, 26:24 followed [1] - 11:21 following [1] - 35:12 follows [1] - 14:3 foot [1] - 6:6 footnote [1] - 68:17 Footnote [6] - 6:5, 6:6, 8:5, 66:2, 68:16, 70:22 foreclose [5] - 52:2, 53:9, 53:19, 54:7, 55:8 foreclosed [3] - 7:9, 53:10 foreclosing [1] - 57:25 foreclosure [12] -5:25, 7:7, 47:25, 50:25, 52:11, 54:3, 54:12, 57:4, 58:10, 65:13, 65:14, 70:11 forestalled [1] - 57:25 form [1] - 10:13 formed [1] - 72:7 forms [1] - 63:9 forth [3] - 49:20, 63:25, 67:9 forum [3] - 9:2, 12:4, 58:19 forward [8] - 13:18, 32:11, 58:13, 62:11, 76:22, 78:5, 78:24, 79:3 four [2] - 56:10, 56:23 frankly [4] - 8:12, 12:2, 49:13, 52:13 front [3] - 14:22, 14:23, 16:18

full [3] - 7:15, 10:13,

14:7

fully [2] - 10:12, 47:23 function [1] - 33:4 funds [3] - 20:24, 29:23, 36:10

G

games [1] - 62:7 general [5] - 14:11, 24:4, 31:8, 45:1 Generally [1] - 43:15 generally [2] - 18:3, 37:20 generate [1] - 43:8 given [9] - 32:18, 35:16, 35:23, 36:18, 40:4, 40:15, 40:19, 43:17, 78:20 Given [1] - 40:10 governed [1] - 64:22 governing [1] - 9:7 government [1] -26:15 granted [4] - 12:17, 72:20, 76:3, 78:18 grants [1] - 76:20 Guaranteed [2] -33:10, 33:19 guess [1] - 29:3 guessing [1] - 41:8

H

half [1] - 31:6 handed [1] - 10:17 handled [1] - 81:5 handling [1] - 60:16 happy [1] - 54:17 hard [1] - 60:21 harms [1] - 58:1 hats [1] - 32:13 heading [2] - 20:3, 20:9 hear [4] - 4:15, 10:17, 10:21, 81:8 heard [3] - 11:2, 15:4, 62:13 hearing [12] - 5:15, 5:19, 6:10, 6:17, 6:21, 12:7, 47:19, 57:8, 65:11, 66:1, 77:7, 77:20 hearsay [1] - 26:16 heart [1] - 69:22 Heiner [4] - 13:17, 13:18, 14:9, 47:22 HEINER [1] - 14:1 held [12] - 8:15, 11:11, 11:13, 11:15, 17:20, 36:12, 38:21, 39:2,

55:5, 55:13, 57:13, 67:16 helpful [1] - 69:11 herein [2] - 14:2, 59:7 history [1] - 33:6 hold [5] - 34:4, 34:6, 67:10, 67:14, 67:23 holding [2] - 67:8, 72:10 holdings [2] - 67:10, 68:1 home [2] - 55:4, 55:12 Honor [26] - 4:7, 4:17, 5:14, 5:18, 5:20, 6:24, 8:1, 8:5, 13:7, 13:23, 15:10, 17:5, 34:16, 36:3, 36:20, 46:8, 46:13, 46:15, 46:21, 47:7, 48:17, 48:19, 57:12, 65:12, 66:1, 66:10 hopes [1] - 53:2 housekeeping [1] -5:5 husband's [1] - 49:1

i.e [2] - 9:22, 35:19 idea [1] - 43:9 identified [6] - 15:15, 15:20, 18:18, 54:1, 67:24, 69:18 identifies [1] - 25:7 identify [3] - 18:14, 25:3, 45:12 identity [1] - 37:10 immediately [1] - 62:9 Immediately [1] -31:20 impact [4] - 70:23, 71:2, 78:19, 81:17 impair [2] - 74:5, 74:23 important [2] - 8:2, 77:9 imposed [1] - 43:18 imposing [2] - 75:17, 78:24 impressed [1] - 73:23 improper [1] - 63:11 improperly [1] - 59:2 inadequate [1] - 80:20 inappropriate [4] -35:2, 74:7, 74:18, 78:20 inaudible [2] - 12:11,

16:6

Inc [1] - 54:18

include [1] - 70:17

included [3] - 38:13, 39:25, 62:4 includes [2] - 49:20, 71:12 including [2] - 11:10, 75:1 Indeed [2] - 57:12, 64:16 indeed [1] - 48:6 independent [1] - 71:6 index [3] - 44:2, 44:5, 44:11 indicates [1] - 72:5 indication [1] - 72:5 indicia [1] - 67:17 individual [8] - 40:6, 40:23, 41:13, 41:25, 59:6, 59:8, 75:1, 75:15 individually [15] -11:12, 11:17, 16:2, 38:24, 39:3, 41:1, 41:6, 41:19, 41:23, 42:10, 44:12, 44:15, 44:18, 75:19, 75:24 Individually [1] -38:25 individuals [3] - 44:8, 75:10, 75:14

Document 24-1

89 of 96

inequitable [2] - 53:3, 53:5 inform [1] - 80:12 information [2] -19:23, 45:7 initiated [1] - 55:6 injunction [17] - 4:13, 4:16, 10:12, 12:13, 48:2, 57:9, 58:4, 58:12, 61:6, 66:15, 74:19, 76:1, 76:19, 76:20, 76:25, 77:7, 78:17 injunctions [1] - 12:16 Injunctive [1] - 57:10 injunctive [1] - 7:23 injuries [1] - 70:10 injury [4] - 57:18, 57:21, 57:22 injustice [1] - 56:23 insofar [1] - 54:4 instructions [1] -21:21 instrument [1] - 18:16 insurability [3] -32:18, 33:1, 36:7 insurance [2] - 14:18, 30:6 Insurance [2] - 31:22,

intended [1] - 80:12 interest [65] - 6:1, 6:12, 7:15, 9:8, 9:13, 9:14, 10:9, 48:6, 49:4, 50:6, 50:19, 51:7, 52:3, 53:17, 53:18, 54:7, 57:14, 57:15, 58:5, 58:6, 58:8, 66:7, 68:12, 68:22, 69:2, 69:9, 69:13, 69:15, 70:9, 70:10, 70:18, 70:20, 71:1, 71:5, 71:12, 71:16, 71:21, 72:3, 72:24, 73:3, 73:6, 73:8, 73:9, 73:16, 73:17, 73:19, 73:21, 74:4, 74:9, 74:14, 74:17, 74:20, 74:25, 75:1, 75:15, 75:18, 75:23, 76:2, 76:7, 77:5, 77:6, 78:21, interesting [1] - 81:8 interestingly [1] -

18:15 interests [8] - 53:9. 63:15, 71:4, 75:3, 75:4, 75:5, 75:8, 81:4

interfere [2] - 12:14, 60:20 interference [1] -

12:13 intermeddler[1] -52:8 internal [1] - 70:3

interrupt [1] - 13:8 intervene [1] - 6:18 introduced [4] -41:18, 41:20, 41:21, 42:14

inventory [1] - 48:24 Investors [1] - 25:8 invoke [1] - 64:12 involve [5] - 32:3, 32:19, 32:22, 34:1, 73:5

involved [6] - 12:8, 19:24, 46:1, 73:3, 81:3, 81:6 involving [7] - 8:16. 32:13, 63:20, 64:22,

66:19, 70:4, 71:11 irreparable [2] - 57:18, 57:21

irreplaceable [3] -55:21, 57:20, 57:24 issuance [5] - 63:11, 65:22, 67:25, 68:11,

74:23 issue [31] - 10:10, 10:12, 12:7, 12:8, 14:15, 35:14, 36:2, 40:12, 49:5, 50:15, 53:22, 58:12, 60:11,

61:13, 62:2, 64:13, 64:17, 66:22, 67:3, 67:4, 67:18, 69:19, 69:24, 71:7, 72:15,

72:16, 73:2, 73:7, 78:12, 81:15 issued [16] - 4:14, 10:24, 11:4, 12:19,

14:17, 30:6, 53:25, 59:2, 61:16, 61:17, 62:8, 64:9, 66:22, 72:11, 73:1, 77:15 issues [32] - 4:22, 9:3,

10:21, 11:1, 12:3, 12:5, 31:12, 31:13, 32:4, 35:15, 48:3, 58:19, 58:25, 60:9, 60:17, 60:22, 61:2, 61:22, 66:17, 66:20,

66:21, 68:7, 68:8, 68:9, 73:25, 77:4, 79:17, 79:21, 80:10, 81:12

item [2] - 20:5, 59:7 items [1] - 5:8 itself [6] - 7:6, 8:3, 16:3, 49:13, 68:11, 71:25

J

January [3] - 4:1, 47:25, 54:3 John [3] - 14:16, 15:7, 45:18 JOHNSON [32] - 4:10,

10:16, 13:1, 15:13, 17:14, 19:3, 19:17, 21:7, 22:15, 23:4, 24:9, 25:21, 25:23, 26:13, 26:24, 28:10, 28:23, 31:1, 34:21, 36:23, 37:2, 39:15, 43:16, 46:6, 46:17, 47:3, 47:12, 58:17, 63:1, 79:15, 80:22, 80:24

Johnson [15] - 4:10, 6:16, 26:23, 34:20, 36:22, 39:17, 40:1, 40:19, 43:23, 47:9, 47:11, 58:16, 69:7, 79:13, 80:23

joint [5] - 68:18,

32:9

intend [1] - 13:14

justify [2] - 35:7, 43:19

Case 1:25-cv-00008-DAK-CMR

K

keep [1] - 65:21 kind [1] - 81:15 knowing [1] - 52:25 knowledge [5] - 18:6, 18:21, 43:5, 45:2, 50:23

L

labeling [1] - 16:2 laid [1] - 52:25 Lake [1] - 14:13 language [4] - 69:10, 70:13, 70:15, 71:12 lapse [1] - 34:9 large [2] - 55:22, 57:6 last [2] - 34:10, 48:23 law [9] - 10:3, 12:6, 30:24, 51:16, 52:24, 57:18, 59:21, 69:18, 81:16 lawsuit [1] - 79:19 lawsuits [1] - 65:18 least [2] - 54:12, 71:4 leave [1] - 68:8 leaves [1] - 53:8 left [2] - 18:19, 80:18 legal [32] - 11:1, 11:5, 11:9, 12:24, 31:2, 32:3, 35:13, 35:14, 35:15, 35:16, 35:19, 35:20, 35:25, 36:7, 36:16, 39:23, 40:8, 40:10, 40:13, 43:14, 43:21, 60:22, 61:1, 61:11, 61:14, 61:22, 62:2, 79:17, 79:20, 80:5, 80:13, 80:19 legally [1] - 57:20 lender [3] - 19:10, 19:13, 45:22 less [1] - 50:23 liable [1] - 56:19 license [2] - 34:6, 34:13 licenses [1] - 34:4 lien [48] - 5:23, 5:24, 6:12, 7:16, 8:21, 9:7, 9:20, 9:23, 11:19, 30:17, 36:12, 43:12, 43:24, 47:25, 48:8, 50:11, 50:13, 51:9, 51:20, 52:11, 52:14, 53:15, 55:5, 55:12, 57:4, 58:10, 59:19, 59:21, 59:22, 63:14,

64:8, 65:24, 66:4, 66:9, 67:10, 67:18, 67:22, 68:19, 69:5, 72:10, 72:12, 74:11, 76:10 liens [5] - 9:19, 49:20, 51:17, 51:22, 70:12 lies [1] - 73:21 lifetime [2] - 39:7, 60:2 likelihood [4] - 9:6, 9:17, 57:6, 57:11 limit [1] - 69:19 limitation [5] - 39:24, 43:18, 67:24, 75:16, limitation," [1] - 6:15 limitations [1] - 35:12 limited [4] - 8:17, 65:7, 75:22, 76:21 line [1] - 20:5 lines [1] - 42:18 list [2] - 20:10, 49:20 listed [5] - 20:4, 48:25, 49:2, 49:3, 49:22 litigate [2] - 5:22, 10:13 litigated [1] - 72:15 litigation [7] - 23:13, 32:1, 48:3, 54:13, 72:4, 72:6 living [1] - 14:10 loan [2] - 46:1, 52:5 located [2] - 9:1, 71:14 look [17] - 19:6, 21:18, 22:4, 22:11, 24:5, 24:12, 25:6, 26:6, 29:10, 37:3, 39:13, 44:11, 45:11, 48:10, 58:24, 59:3, 60:21 looked [4] - 29:21, 38:8, 41:9, 81:13 looking [1] - 43:7 looks [2] - 20:20, 53:23 losing [1] - 57:24 loss [2] - 10:1, 76:18 lost [5] - 57:4, 59:17, 62:16, 64:5, 76:14

M

Madison [1] - 25:8 mail [1] - 18:20 main [1] - 50:15 maintained [2] -27:13, 27:18 managed [1] - 32:1 manner [1] - 65:17

mark [4] - 16:4, 16:5, 16:10, 16:12 marked [4] - 15:19, 15:20, 15:21, 16:3 marking [1] - 16:2 material [1] - 9:5 materials [2] - 6:11, 54:16 matter [20] - 5:4, 6:8, 7:11, 10:22, 10:25, 30:24, 30:25, 35:16, 35:19, 43:19, 58:20, 60:10, 60:16, 61:17, 62:12, 62:15, 62:18, 66:14, 79:19 matter." [1] - 68:20 matters [4] - 5:12, 34:18, 80:14, 80:17 maximum [1] - 58:9 mean [6] - 13:8, 15:17, 25:5, 26:24, 32:16, 72:14 means [3] - 20:5, 20:6, 25:6 measure [1] - 12:16 member [1] - 34:5 memories [1] - 81:6 mention [1] - 59:11 mentioned [1] - 65:11 merely [2] - 63:6, 63:10 merits [3] - 9:6, 10:13, 57:12 met [3] - 54:11, 57:21, 58:11 Metro [41] - 14:12, 14:14, 14:17, 15:8, 17:9, 17:17, 19:24, 20:21, 20:24, 21:22, 23:17, 23:24, 26:6, 26:19, 27:11, 27:13, 27:18, 27:20, 29:4, 29:7, 31:4, 31:6, 31:14, 31:15, 31:16, 31:19, 31:20, 33:3, 36:5, 37:4, 37:17, 37:22, 38:14, 38:17, 44:10, 45:14, 47:17, 49:18, 81:2, 81:3 Metro's [2] - 29:4, 29:19 might [6] - 21:17, 50:20, 76:14 million [2] - 51:8, 52:3 missed [1] - 55:5 misspoken [1] - 40:24 mistake [2] - 56:1, 56:2

money [2] - 45:21, 58:1 morning [1] - 15:5 mortgages [1] - 70:12 most [1] - 12:17 motion [20] - 5:19, 6:17, 7:20, 7:23, 48:2, 61:5, 61:6, 62:20, 65:12, 66:10, 77:16, 77:18, 77:19, 77:20, 77:21, 78:5, 78:6, 78:10, 78:13 motions [1] - 80:7 Move [9] - 19:14, 21:3, 22:12, 23:1, 24:6, 25:18, 26:10, 28:7, 28:20 move [8] - 15:10, 17:11, 18:25, 34:16, 46:21, 47:13, 58:13, 62:11 moved [3] - 33:3, 33:16, 33:17 Mow [13] - 8:25, 60:5, 60:9, 60:22, 61:22, 62:17, 63:5, 64:1, 64:3, 64:6, 64:13, 67:4, 68:7 Mow's [1] - 61:20 MR [88] - 4:7, 4:10, 4:17, 4:19, 4:24, 5:2, 5:4, 5:13, 10:16, 13:1, 13:6, 13:11, 13:13, 13:15, 13:17, 13:23, 14:6, 15:10, 15:13, 15:17, 15:25, 16:5, 16:9, 16:11, 16:16, 17:5, 17:11, 17:14, 18:25, 19:3, 19:14, 19:17, 21:3, 21:5, 21:7, 22:12, 22:15, 23:1, 23:4, 24:6, 24:9, 25:18, 25:21, 25:23, 26:10, 26:13, 26:18, 26:24, 27:3, 28:7, 28:10, 28:20, 28:23, 31:1, 34:16, 34:21, 36:3, 36:14, 36:20, 36:23, 37:2, 39:15, 39:23, 40:8, 43:14, 43:16, 46:6, 46:8, 46:13, 46:15, 46:17, 46:21, 47:3, 47:6, 47:12, 47:16, 54:22, 54:24, 55:1, 58:15, 58:17, 63:1, 63:3, 79:6, 79:11, 79:15, 80:22, 80:24 Mulligan [7] - 4:5,

Molly [3] - 14:16, 15:6,

45:17

parcels [1] - 10:5

part [6] - 6:10, 17:23,

Case 1:25-cv-00008-DAK-CMR

N

name [20] - 14:7, 18:21, 25:11, 25:13, 25:15, 38:15, 38:18, 38:19, 41:1, 41:5, 41:19, 41:22, 41:24, 44:7, 44:14, 56:8, 67:16, 68:23, 81:5, 81:8 named [1] - 39:19 names [2] - 20:4, 41:14 National [17] - 14:12, 14:14, 14:17, 17:9, 19:24, 21:22, 26:6, 27:11, 27:13, 27:18, 27:20, 31:14, 31:15, 31:16, 38:14, 45:14, nature [2] - 5:11, 77:4 necessarily [1] - 6:13 necessary [2] - 4:24, 54:18 need [3] - 15:19, 29:11, 72:17 needed [2] - 17:21, 20:7 needs [1] - 60:21 neglected [1] - 54:15 never[1] - 59:9

积州积均差域 理想歌海 next(10-48-9) None 22 - 15:13. 48:17 Noncutt H - 54:19. 55:2, 55:9, 55:10 Norcutts [3] - 55:4, 55:16, 55:18 normal [1] - 43:5 note [2] - 4:6, 8:2 noted [3] - 8:5, 66:1, 66:18 notes [2] - 71:22, 77:11 nothing [9] - 41:1, 42:14, 48:25, 49:2, 49:3, 52:18, 62:12, 63:15, 74:22 notice [5] - 7:6, 11:24, 30:13, 34:22, 49:24 noticed [1] - 62:11 November [9] - 5:17, 30:14, 48:18, 48:19, 52:15, 57:13, 62:10, 65:11, 66:1 nuanced [1] - 59:25 Number [2] - 56:14, 56:18 number [13] - 5:17, 11:8, 16:15, 22:6, 22:24, 27:6, 30:5, 42:4, 47:20, 56:23, 67:23 numbers [1] - 16:20

一次海流

0

oath [1] - 13:19 object [5] - 25:21, 27:8, 34:21, 34:24, objecting [2] - 27:5, 66:24 Objection [4] - 31:1, 39:23, 40:8, 43:14 objection [31] - 15:12, 17:13, 17:14, 19:2, 19:3, 19:16, 19:17, 21:6, 21:7, 22:14, 22:15, 23:3, 23:4, 24:8, 24:9, 25:20, 25:23, 26:12, 26:13, 26:16, 28:9, 28:10, 28:22, 28:23, 35:20, 40:9, 43:18, 46:16, 47:1, 47:3, 68:13 objections [2] - 63:10,

第15 sibligation (4) - 18:18, 19:13, 52:8, 56:22 obligations Z -49:16, 51:15 obtained |4| - 6:4, 72:7. 75:11. 78:1 obtaining [1] - 74:17 obviously [1] - 55:10 Obviously [1] - 47:16 occasionally [1] -31:17 occur[2] - 75:9, 76:18 occurred [1] - 56:13 October [1] - 49:21 offer [1] - 79:16 offered [4] - 5:10, 27:7, 27:11, 27:12 offering [2] - 26:25, 31:2 office [12] - 25:3, 27:12, 27:16, 40:5, 40:21, 41:11, 41:18, 41:22, 41:23, 42:7, 44:1, 72:10 Office [1] - 25:7 office." [1] - 67:11 officer [1] - 36:5 officers [1] - 31:11 official [1] - 26:15 old [1] - 7:7 Once [1] - 10:16 once [2] - 10:18, 77:24 one [20] - 4:21, 12:7, 12:14, 20:14, 20:17, 24:24, 30:5, 38:8, 40:16, 42:3, 43:1, 46:24, 47:21, 48:10, 55:3, 60:14, 60:16, 75:11, 80:3, 81:1 ones [1] - 15:5 open [1] - 10:22 opening [1] - 4:25 openings [1] - 13:3 opine [1] - 70:22 opinion [24] - 8:12, 31:2, 35:5, 35:11, 35:13, 35:15, 35:22, 36:2, 36:5, 36:13, 36:16, 40:11, 40:14, 40:16, 43:20, 43:22, 55:22, 64:17, 66:2, 68:19, 70:23, 73:5

opinions [2] - 35:4,

Opinions [1] - 35:6

opposing [1] - 4:21

opportunity [5] - 11:5,

13:16, 34:23, 59:15,

35:8

63:5

oralim - 6:4 order [16] - 4:13, 6:25, 7:1, 7:18, 30:8, 52:4, 52:5, 58:3, 58:4, 61:6, 61:21, 62:14, 65:16, 75:20, 77:2, 77:17 ordered [2] - 6:21, 6:23 originally [3] - 10:24, 49:9, 78:1 originating [1] - 6:13 otherwise [3] - 51:21, 55:24, 60:20 ought [4] - 10:12, 52:10, 58:12, 80:4 outlined [1] - 54:11 outside [2] - 69:20, 72:17 outweighs [1] - 57:22 overbroad [1] - 78:20 overlapping [1] -73:25 owed [4] - 51:15, 51:16, 52:8, 53:2 own [3] - 50:9, 59:8, 71:12 owned [4] - 9:11, 59:9, 59:12 owner [3] - 70:25, 71:1, 71:2 owner's [1] - 14:17 owners [1] - 75:14 ownership [7] - 67:17, 68:18, 70:23, 70:25, 71:18, 73:18, 75:20

P

P-1 [7] - 17:15, 19:4, 19:18, 23:3, 25:24, 28:11, 39:14 P.2d [1] - 10:7 P.3d [3] - 54:19, 54:23, 54:24 page [10] - 6:10, 10:7, 18:15, 48:23, 49:25, 59:1, 60:18, 64:16 paid [16] - 9:18, 29:24, 30:5, 30:16, 36:10, 46:3, 51:8, 51:9, 51:14, 51:17, 52:21, 53:7, 55:4, 55:12, 55:19, 56:12 paragraph [9] - 49:2, 59:1, 59:3, 64:16, 64:20, 67:9, 69:11, 69:16, 69:17 paragraphs [1] - 64:15 parcel [2] - 25:1, 26:5

21:21, 51:4, 51:5, 60:6 participate [1] - 6:19 particular [4] - 25:1, 26:5, 60:14, 75:10 particularly [3] -32:13, 66:23, 69:1 parties [3] - 71:4, 80:12, 81:11 partition [1] - 70:11 party [13] - 5:20, 37:11, 52:11, 56:11, 56:12, 56:14, 56:18, 56:24, 57:23, 65:3, 65:6, 78:3, 78:9 pay [4] - 51:11, 52:4, 52:8, 56:16 payees [1] - 20:10 payoff [1] - 51:22 payor [2] - 20:4, 45:17 pending [7] - 10:22, 10:25, 48:3, 54:13, 58:20, 68:8 people [5] - 35:6, 42:3, 42:7, 42:11, 45:3 per [1] - 47:20 perceived [1] - 74:21 percent [6] - 50:20, 50:21, 73:14, 73:18 perhaps [3] - 71:1, 77:23, 79:21 period [2] - 32:12, 64:18 permit [2] - 35:11, 78:9 person [1] - 36:6 personally [8] - 9:11, 9:12, 29:5, 29:8, 48:17, 49:5, 50:6, 65:6 pick [1] - 72:19 piece [1] - 57:19 place [1] - 13:19 placed [2] - 9:21, 36:9 plaintiff [3] - 53:11, 54:1, 54:5 plaintiff's [1] - 15:22 Plaintiff's [7] - 15:22, 16:13, 16:15, 16:18, 16:21, 16:22, 17:2 plaintiffs [3] - 4:14, 53:21, 54:10 playing [1] - 62:7 pleadings [1] - 5:19 point [10] - 6:3, 6:5, 6:19, 11:5, 23:12, 27:17, 44:16, 47:24,

property [156] - 7:15,

Case 1:25-cv-00008-DAK-CMR

9:17, 57:11 prevent[3] - 9:24, 10:1, 67:25 previous [1] - 21:18 previously [3] - 4:14, 39:25, 43:18 primarily [1] - 56:19 primary [2] - 24:24, 34:6 principle [4] - 12:5, 12:10, 12:22, 60:13 printout [1] - 26:14 priority [8] - 10:1, 30:15, 30:17, 30:24, 36:12, 51:21, 53:6, 55:25 problem [2] - 8:10, 61:9 Procedurally [1] -79:16 proceed [17] - 7:6, 11:7, 11:10, 11:16, 16:24, 27:22, 47:15, 58:23, 59:14, 59:25, 61:2, 61:12, 61:18, 62:9, 74:8, 80:17 proceeded [1] - 65:14 proceeding [14] -6:19, 8:15, 12:14, 12:15, 40:14, 45:16, 46:24, 55:6, 61:5, 63:6, 63:8, 63:9, 63:13, 64:21 proceeding," [1] -64:20 proceedings [5] -7:25, 8:7, 16:14, 47:24, 65:7 Proceedings [1] -81:22 process [10] - 23:12, 31:13, 38:2, 42:21, 43:5, 43:8, 43:11, 44:3, 62:5 produced [1] - 27:4 professional [3] -34:4, 34:6, 34:12 pronounce [1] - 68:23 pronounced [1] -68:25 pronunciation [1] -15:4 proof [4] - 53:13, 53:22, 54:11, 66:6 proper [7] - 12:4, 66:24, 68:12, 72:8, 72:21, 73:19, 74:13 properly [9] - 11:20, 59:19, 66:22, 73:10,

8:14, 8:16, 8:20, 8:22, 8:23, 9:1, 9:11, 10:2, 10:4, 10:9, 11:10, 11:13, 14:15, 14:19, 17:10, 17:19, 17:23, 18:17, 19:12, 19:25, 24:20, 25:1, 25:2, 26:5, 28:6, 29:2, 29:7, 29:13, 30:5, 32:25, 34:2, 34:19, 36:8, 37:5, 37:21, 37:22, 37:24, 38:18, 39:7, 40:21, 43:24, 46:3, 48:7, 48:12, 48:25, 49:1, 49:3, 49:5, 49:9, 49:10, 49:16, 49:18, 50:6, 50:8, 50:9, 50:10, 50:12, 50:17, 50:18, 50:25, 51:4, 51:5, 51:9, 51:23, 52:6, 52:17, 53:1, 53:3, 53:16, 53:18, 55:20, 55:21, 56:4, 56:17, 57:3, 57:19, 57:24, 58:8, 58:10, 59:4, 59:8, 59:10, 59:11, 59:23, 60:3, 62:16, 63:8, 63:15, 63:17, 63:20, 63:24, 64:11, 64:22, 66:7, 66:8, 66:23, 67:15, 67:17, 68:2, 68:12, 68:18, 68:22, 69:6, 69:9, 69:13, 69:15, 69:24, 70:4, 70:8, 70:9, 70:10, 70:11, 70:18, 70:21, 71:6, 71:11, 71:13, 71:16, 71:21, 72:4, 72:6, 72:23, 72:24, 73:3, 73:6, 73:9, 73:13, 73:17, 73:18, 73:19, 73:21, 74:4, 74:10, 74:13, 74:16, 74:18, 74:20, 75:2, 75:8, 75:10, 75:14, 75:24, 76:2, 76:11, 76:13, 76:23, 77:5, 77:6, 78:20, 78:21 property's [1] - 11:15 property." [2] - 6:2, 70:12 proposed [1] - 76:1 propriety [2] - 67:2, 77:21 protect [3] - 10:8, 76:6, 76:17 protocol [1] - 16:19

prove [7] - 7:14, 53:17, 54:6, 54:10, 58:7, 58:9, 66:6 provide [4] - 34:23, 54:17, 80:19 provided [8] - 4:19, 4:20, 9:4, 17:9, 18:1, 18:6, 48:20, 76:21 provides [4] - 8:24, 48:24, 51:16, 70:2 PRP [1] - 25:8 prudent [1] - 40:21 public [2] - 58:4, 58:6 purchase [2] - 29:23, 52:5 purchased [2] - 14:15, 14:18 purpose [2] - 17:17, 26:7 purposes [3] - 26:20, 40:13, 57:8 pursuant [3] - 21:21, 62:13, 72:24 put [5] - 16:17, 36:11, 54:16, 64:20, 66:5

Q

qualified [1] - 34:17 queries [2] - 47:16, 65:12 questions [14] - 5:11, 31:12, 35:14, 36:14, 46:6, 62:23, 62:24, 66:11, 66:12, 68:3, 79:8, 80:5, 80:19, 81:19 quick [2] - 21:17, 22:3 quiet [1] - 63:25 quite [1] - 12:6 quote [11] - 6:1, 6:11, 6:15, 10:5, 63:20, 64:16, 69:16, 70:1, 70:3, 70:4, 70:11 quoted [2] - 57:18, 63:18 quotes [1] - 70:3 quoting [3] - 6:3, 67:14, 68:17

R

raised [5] - 11:8, 11:23, 58:19, 73:25, 80:3 raises [1] - 69:7 ran [3] - 44:13, 44:17 rank [1] - 12:12 re [2] - 7:6, 28:15

re-notice [1] - 7:6 reach [4] - 48:11, 50:17, 53:15, 66:9 reached [1] - 44:21 read [2] - 60:14, 69:16 real [33] - 8:14, 8:16, 8:22, 8:23, 10:2, 10:8, 14:15, 29:13, 34:2, 34:19, 36:8, 50:25, 55:21, 57:3, 57:24, 63:8, 63:15, 63:17, 63:20, 63:24, 64:11, 64:22, 70:4, 70:8, 70:10, 70:11, 70:12, 71:11, 72:3, 72:6, 76:15, 76:16, really [2] - 62:2, 78:4 reason [6] - 34:10, 49:12, 57:1, 68:19, 74:19, 76:8 reasons [3] - 24:24, 54:10, 61:25 rebuttal [1] - 34:23 receipts [3] - 20:3, 45:14, 45:17 received [25] - 16:22, 16:23, 17:15, 17:16, 19:4, 19:5, 19:18, 19:19, 21:8, 21:9, 22:16, 22:17, 23:5, 23:6, 24:10, 24:11, 25:24, 25:25, 27:23, 28:11, 28:12, 28:24, 28:25, 47:4, 47:5 recess [1] - 81:20 recognize [11] - 12:22, 14:22, 14:25, 17:7, 18:9, 19:7, 21:13, 22:19, 26:2, 27:25, 28:14 recognized [3] - 10:3, 12:10, 57:19 reconvey [1] - 21:23 reconveyance [3] -21:16, 22:20, 49:21 reconveying [1] -22:25 record [12] - 4:4, 9:19, 14:8, 26:15, 27:10, 27:11, 27:13, 27:17, 50:5, 52:17, 56:7,

65:21

recorded [20] - 11:20,
18:20, 19:12, 24:3,
24:25, 28:3, 28:16,
30:10, 30:11, 30:12,
30:14, 42:25, 43:11,
43:25, 49:24, 50:2,
52:15, 56:7, 59:19,

74:8, 78:21, 79:2

rulings [1] - 80:10

67:11
Recorder [2] - 26:3,
37:24
recorder [7] - 23:21, 23:25, 24:3, 42:22,
42:24, 43:6, 44:2
recorder's [8] - 24:15,
25:2, 25:13, 27:12,
27:16, 43:25, 67:11, 72:9
Recorder's [2] - 25:7,
26:25
recording [2] - 30:9, 72:9
records [17] - 23:18,
23:21, 23:25, 24:1,
24:4, 24:19, 27:10,
27:18, 27:20, 29:4, 29:19, 37:23, 41:10,
44:22, 47:2, 49:18,
56:9
recovery [1] - 70:8 Redirect [1] - 46:7
reduce [1] - 6:25
reduced [1] - 7:19
refer [2] - 12:23, 16:14
referable [1] - 73:11
reference [6] - 22:5, 29:15, 29:17, 29:20,
70:6, 71:10
referenced [1] - 6:5
references [2] - 21:16,
72:3 referencing [2] - 4:20,
22:24
referred [2] - 15:23,
69:12
referring [6] - 16:20, 21:19, 22:22, 29:3,
38:6
refers [3] - 22:1,
22:20, 72:4 reflected [1] - 71:18
regard [21] - 5:7, 6:20,
7:8, 8:10, 8:14, 8:23
23:22, 31:12, 31:13,
32:16, 32:17, 34:2, 34:18, 35:3, 37:24,
37:25, 46:24, 47:17,
50:25, 63:17, 69:11
regarded [1] - 10:4
regarding [5] - 5:7, 31:11, 48:21, 79:9,
79:13
regardless [1] - 75:12
rejected [1] - 64:25
related [3] - 5:16, 62:2, 68:16
relates [1] - 26:4
released [1] - 22:8

Case 1:25-cv-00008-DAK-CMR

```
releases [1] - 21:17
releasing [1] - 22:25
relevant [6] - 66:23,
 67:24, 69:1, 69:18,
 70:13, 77:9
relied [4] - 26:7,
 26:19, 42:12, 60:10
relief [2] - 7:23, 57:10
removed [1] - 76:15
repeat [1] - 40:17
Reply [1] - 13:3
reply [2] - 63:2, 66:19
reports [1] - 32:20
represent [3] - 24:13,
 24:14, 30:9
representative[1] -
 27:20
request [11] - 4:12,
 4:14, 4:16, 34:25,
 35:3, 35:9, 49:23,
 66:15, 72:20, 76:5
requesting [2] - 17:18,
 76:13
require [8] - 12:15,
 16:3, 54:12, 74:7,
 75:21, 76:7, 76:24,
 77:19
required [5] - 29:23,
 30:4, 52:4, 52:9,
 56:16
requirement [2] -
 15:18, 53:13
requirements [1] -
 64:10
requires [3] - 12:11,
 24:2, 71:3
requiring [1] - 79:1
reserve [1] - 5:11
resolve [1] - 79:25
resolved [1] - 68:5
resources [2] - 80:13,
 80:14
respect [8] - 43:19,
 63:8, 67:6, 68:10,
 72:15, 77:12, 78:25,
 81:2
respective [2] - 71:4,
 71:17
respondents [1] -
 11:4
response [2] - 26:17,
 43:17
Response [1] - 58:16
restrain [1] - 48:2
restrained [2] - 7:21,
 54:13
restraining [3] - 4:13,
 57:23, 61:6
restraint [1] - 12:16
restricted [1] - 75:23
```

```
restriction [2] - 36:1,
 78:24
result [2] - 7:12, 78:10
retained [2] - 41:15,
 67:17
return [1] - 36:4
review [1] - 60:19
reviewing [3] - 32:19,
 32:23, 45:2
revocable [4] - 39:7,
 48:7, 60:3, 67:16
rights [1] - 71:17
Riverside [1] - 4:10
Rock [70] - 4:5, 4:10,
 5:20, 5:22, 5:24, 6:7,
 7:3, 7:5, 7:13, 7:19,
 8:13, 8:14, 9:8, 9:20,
 9:23, 9:25, 10:20,
 11:6, 25:7, 30:13,
 30:23, 36:12, 41:3,
 48:1, 50:11, 50:16,
 51:6, 51:20, 51:24,
 52:1, 52:12, 52:14,
 52:17, 52:21, 53:8,
 53:12, 53:15, 53:25,
 54:5, 54:6, 55:11,
 55:13, 55:24, 56:25,
 57:25, 58:7, 58:10,
 58:18, 58:22, 59:14,
 59:25, 61:18, 63:18,
 65:5, 65:10, 65:13,
 65:19, 66:3, 66:5,
 67:10, 67:21, 75:7,
 75:8, 76:5, 76:7,
 76:12, 78:24
Rock's [5] - 5:15,
 5:23, 6:16, 30:17,
 53:17
role [1] - 35:10
routinely [1] - 23:24
Rule [3] - 5:7, 57:10,
 57:17
rule [7] - 24:4, 63:14,
 64:10, 64:11, 66:20,
 71:10, 76:4
ruled [8] - 5:18, 5:20,
 5:23, 8:4, 10:10,
 77:21, 80:9
ruling [35] - 5:11,
 5:16, 6:4, 6:6, 6:7,
 6:20, 6:22, 6:24,
 27:9, 27:17, 61:16,
 61:21, 62:8, 62:18,
 69:22, 73:7, 74:3,
 74:5, 74:24, 75:25,
 77:3, 77:11, 77:15,
 77:17, 78:2, 78:4,
 78:7, 78:8, 78:9,
 78:10, 78:11, 79:5,
 79:9, 79:13, 79:15
```

S sale [23] - 5:25, 7:7, 7:21, 17:10, 19:25, 23:24, 24:20, 29:2, 30:2, 47:25, 48:2, 54:3, 54:4, 54:12, 55:6, 55:14, 62:11, 62:13, 62:16, 65:14, 76:1, 76:23 Salt [1] - 14:12 satisfied [1] - 41:4 saw [1] - 23:10 schedule [2] - 47:21, 48:24 Schedule [1] - 48:24 scheduled [2] - 47:25, 54:3 scope [3] - 7:8, 74:8, 74:20 search [37] - 23:17, 23:25, 24:19, 29:1, 37:4, 37:8, 37:9, 37:13, 37:15, 37:17, 37:22, 38:14, 38:17, 38:19, 38:23, 40:5, 40:22, 40:25, 41:14, 41:24, 42:2, 42:3, 42:7, 42:11, 42:15, 43:2, 44:5, 44:7, 44:10, 44:17, 45:4, 45:6, 49:18, 51:25, 56:1, 56:3, 56:8 searched [8] - 23:21, 37:19, 37:23, 38:3, 41:12, 41:18, 41:22, 42:8 searches [3] - 23:23, 32:23, 38:7 searching [5] - 26:8, 32:22, 32:23, 33:14, 34:18 Searching [1] - 33:14 seated [1] - 13:21 second [7] - 20:17, 57:17, 59:3, 60:6, 60:7, 66:22, 79:18 Second [5] - 12:19, 46:1, 60:24, 67:14 section [1] - 70:6 secure [1] - 19:12 security [3] - 18:16, 18:17, 76:6 see [12] - 17:21, 18:14, 20:14, 20:18, 24:16, 25:10, 30:8, 33:12, 39:16, 39:17, 39:18, 45:18

seeking [1] - 77:25 seem [1] - 12:24 seemingly [1] - 62:17 seize [1] - 59:4 self [1] - 5:7 self-authentication [1] - 5:7 seller [1] - 56:4 sellers [1] - 30:3 senior [4] - 31:20, 31:21, 31:22, 32:11 sentence [2] - 48:9, 60:7 sentences [1] - 64:19 separate [6] - 9:3, 41:4, 49:1, 49:2, 57:13, 73:8 separated [1] - 5:16 separately [1] - 15:15 September [2] - 30:11, 49:14 Services [1] - 31:16 set [3] - 4:12, 4:20, 67:9 settlor [19] - 6:2, 9:14, 39:7, 39:10, 39:21, 40:2, 48:11, 48:13, 48:15, 48:16, 49:5, 56:5, 59:22, 60:2, 66:8, 71:3, 75:1, 75:24 settlor's [6] - 39:8, 48:6, 48:7, 48:8, 50:13, 60:4 settlors [3] - 9:14, 40:20, 71:17 several [1] - 81:6 Shall [1] - 63:22 shall [1] - 70:4 sheriff [1] - 65:14 Sheriff [1] - 62:9 sheriff's [2] - 55:6, 55:14 shoes [4] - 9:21, 36:9, 52:11, 55:18 shopping [1] - 7:11 shortness [1] - 74:1 show [6] - 9:5, 9:6, 20:11, 42:18, 56:20, 57:14 showing [3] - 45:13, 76:12, 76:17 shown [6] - 30:22, 50:5, 50:17, 51:13, 57:7, 59:7 shows [6] - 9:7, 20:1, 20:12, 41:18, 41:22, 42:14 side [2] - 68:17, 80:19

signature [1] - 21:24

Document 24-1

77:24

78:3

76:23

93 of 95

suggesting [2] - 56:2,

74:15, 77:18, 77:23,

suggestions [1] - 62:5

suggests [2] - 69:8,

sum [2] - 20:7, 45:19

summary [3] - 19:22,

supervise [1] - 31:15

supplement [1] - 5:21

supplemental [1] -

support [1] - 76:24

suppose [2] - 42:1,

Supreme [34] - 6:6,

6:7, 8:4, 8:11, 8:14,

59:19, 59:20, 61:19,

61:24, 62:8, 63:7,

63:16, 63:19, 64:7,

64:17, 66:2, 67:5,

67:8, 67:20, 68:14,

70:7, 70:21, 71:9,

71:22, 72:1, 72:11,

72:21, 73:4, 75:3,

surrounding [1] - 11:1

76:9, 81:15

Sustain [1] - 40:9

68:21, 69:10, 69:22,

supportive [1] - 58:6

45:13, 51:13

supervised [2] -

31:25, 32:1

5:19

79:23

sun [1] - 11:6

suggestion [4] -

201195

CORPORTIT - 50:2

DENETY-821

Street 11-60:15

ements:::: - 77:14

MILITARY 12-824, 97,

345,465,5212

53:14, 54:6, 63:18, 63:19, 64:13, 66:6, 70:2 statute." [1] - 64:23 statutes [1] - 11:21 Statutory [1] - 8:20 statutory [2] - 63:13, 64:8 step [3] - 13:18, 46:11, 52:10 stepped [2] - 55:18, 72:14 sticker[1] - 16:18 stickers [1] - 16:6 still [3] - 48:18, 48:20, 78:12 strategically [1] -80:16 struggled [1] - 68:24 sub [2] - 51:7, 55:19 subject [29] - 5:25, 8:8, 9:23, 28:6, 35:5, 35:12, 36:1, 39:8, 43:19, 45:15, 48:7, 51:6, 54:2, 56:25, 57:15, 60:3, 63:21, 63:24, 67:12, 67:18, 67:19, 70:5, 74:13, 75:4, 75:15, 75:19, 78:21, 79:2, 79:21 submit [10] - 8:1, 9:4, 9:16, 10:11, 48:17, 50:1, 57:5, 58:5, 58:11, 66:10 submitted [1] - 77:17 submitting [1] - 15:19 subordinated [1] -51:7 subordinating [1] -52:3 subordination [1] -11:25 subpoena [1] - 47:20 subrogated [4] -30:15, 36:9, 51:17, 53:6 subrogation [13] -

9:18, 9:21, 11:25,

51:19, 55:8, 55:16,

55:23, 56:11, 56:12,

56:14, 56:18, 56:24,

substantial [5] - 9:6,

substitute [1] - 55:10

sufficiency [1] - 77:8

sufficient [2] - 54:12,

suffer [1] - 57:18

9:16, 57:3, 57:6,

77:4

57:11

sustained [1] - 35:21 Sustained [2] - 31:3, 39:24 sworn [2] - 13:20, 14:2 system [1] - 12:7 Т Tab [75] - 15:14, 16:22, 16:23, 17:2, 17:3, 17:11, 17:13, 17:15, 17:16, 18:7, 18:25, 19:4, 19:5, 19:7, 19:14, 19:18, 19:19, 19:21, 21:5, 21:6, 21:8, 21:9, 21:11, 22:2, 22:8, 22:9, 22:12, 22:16, 22:17, 22:18, 22:21, 22:22, 23:3, 23:5, 23:6, 23:8, 24:6, 24:7, 24:8, 24:10, 24:11, 24:13, 24:14,

24:15, 25:19, 25:24, 25:25, 26:2, 26:10, 27:23, 27:25, 28:11, 28:12, 28:13, 28:22, 28:24, 28:25, 29:11, 29:20, 30:10, 30:12, 30:13, 37:3, 39:14, 39:15, 45:11, 48:24, 50:1, 50:2, 51:10, 51:11, 51:12, 52:15 tab [2] - 16:15, 16:20 table [1] - 15:17 Tabs [4] - 30:22, 47:1, 47:4, 47:5 tabs [3] - 15:24, 21:18, 38:11 temporary [2] - 4:13, 61:5 Ten [2] - 14:22, 14:23 terms [2] - 37:19, 62:5 testified [1] - 14:3 testify [5] - 4:22, 13:19, 34:17, 42:1, 46:24 testimony [6] - 24:18, 26:19, 42:17, 46:10, 52:4, 56:8 THE [92] - 4:4, 4:9, 4:11, 4:18, 4:23, 4:25, 5:3, 5:9, 10:15, 12:25, 13:2, 13:10, 13:12, 13:14, 13:16, 13:18, 13:21, 13:22, 13:24, 15:12, 15:14, 15:18, 16:1, 16:7, 16:10, 16:12, 16:17, 16:24, 17:2, 17:6, 17:13, 17:15, 19:2, 19:4, 19:16, 19:18, 21:4, 21:6, 21:8, 22:14, 22:16, 23:3, 23:5, 24:8, 24:10, 25:20, 25:22, 25:24, 26:12, 26:17, 26:22, 27:2, 27:9, 28:9, 28:11, 28:22, 28:24, 31:3, 34:20, 34:25, 36:15, 36:21, 39:14, 39:16, 39:24, 40:9, 40:17, 43:15, 43:17, 46:7, 46:9, 46:12, 46:14, 46:16, 46:18, 47:1, 47:4, 47:8, 47:13, 54:21, 54:23, 54:25, 58:14, 58:16, 62:24, 63:2, 66:12, 79:7, 79:12, 79:23, 80:23, 80:25 Theirs [1] - 63:6 themselves [1] - 56:20

therefore [13] - 6:14, 7:21, 9:20, 51:5, 53:19, 53:21, 54:6. 57:20, 57:21, 58:9, 65:16, 66:5, 74:16 Therefore [2] - 8:17, 50:11 they've [1] - 58:24 Third [33] - 8:25, 10:22, 11:2, 12:2, 12:20, 12:23, 46:23, 53:25, 58:20, 58:25, 60:5, 60:12, 60:22, 60:24, 61:3, 61:7, 61:15, 61:16, 62:3, 63:12, 69:23, 71:15, 71:20, 72:8, 72:11, 72:14, 72:16, 72:17, 72:19, 73:1, 73:11, 73:12, 73:20 third [3] - 57:23, 62:15, 65:1 three [5] - 56:18, 59:13, 67:9, 67:23, 68:1 throughout [1] - 23:12 TILT [56] - 4:7, 4:17, 4:19, 4:24, 5:2, 5:4, 5:13, 13:6, 13:11, 13:13, 13:15, 13:17, 13:23, 14:6, 15:10, 15:17, 15:25, 16:5, 16:9, 16:11, 16:16, 17:5, 17:11, 18:25, 19:14, 21:3, 21:5, 22:12, 23:1, 24:6, 25:18, 26:10, 26:18, 27:3, 28:7, 28:20, 34:16, 36:3, 36:14, 36:20, 39:23, 40:8, 43:14, 46:8, 46:13, 46:15, 46:21, 47:6, 47:16, 54:22, 54:24, 55:1, 58:15, 63:3, 79:6, 79:11 Tilt [27] - 4:7, 16:25, 17:3, 17:7, 17:17, 19:6, 19:20, 21:10, 22:18, 23:7, 24:12, 26:1, 26:17, 27:2, 27:24, 28:13, 29:1, 31:4, 36:4, 46:20, 47:15, 63:2, 66:18, 67:1, 77:1, 79:4, timely [1] - 65:17 timing [2] - 52:13, 62:12 Title [32] - 14:12, 14:14, 14:17, 17:9,

19:24, 21:23, 23:17, 27:11, 27:14, 27:18, 27:20, 31:5, 31:14, 31:16, 31:22, 32:8, 33:3, 33:7, 33:9, 33:10, 33:19, 36:5, 37:17, 37:22, 38:14, 38:17, 44:10, 45:14, 49:18, 81:2, 81:3, title (33) - 14:18, 15:6. 17:19, 284, 288, 27:1, 28:5, 30:5, 3025. 3050. 30:12. 223 2218 3219. 空医三角 至17. 突性 医毛牙虫 **B21**, **B2**, 4219, ## ST25 526 图5 图1 图3. THE REPORT 67:15, Title to 41 - 26.5. TE 47:17, 81:4 Mars 11 - 33:15 - 4:20, 4:24, **里性 配1**, 6:16, 7:22, 725, 11:22, 12:1, 18:22, 34:22, 389, 41:18, 41:20, 41 21, 42:14, 44:23, 44:25, 45:9, 47:18, 48:1, 48:20, 54:15, 66:14, 70:19, 77:10, 77:12, 79:9, 79:14, 80:6, 80:8 today's [2] - 47:24, 57:8 tongue [1] - 47:18 took [1] - 7:5 top [1] - 18:19 Traci[11] - 17:20, 17:22, 18:13, 19:9, 28:4, 28:17, 28:18, 30:2, 39:18, 39:19, 49:3 Traci's [1] - 68:18 traditional [1] - 10:13 training [1] - 35:7 trans [1] - 19:24 transaction [11] -14:20, 15:8, 18:2, 19:25, 20:8, 20:25, 21:21, 26:9, 41:4, 45:15, 46:2 transactions [1] -31:17 transcript [6] - 6:4, 6:10, 6:21, 6:23, 7:1,

Case 1:25-cv-00008-DAK-CMR

7:4 Transportation[1] -10:6 tried [4] - 63:20, 64:12, 70:4, 71:13 true [1] - 40:19 Trust [23] - 15:6, 17:8, 17:18, 17:21, 17:25, 18:14, 19:10, 19:13, 20:1, 23:20, 24:21, 25:15, 28:5, 28:17, 28:19, 29:5, 29:8, 29:16, 29:18, 30:3, 38:1, 38:20, 56:21 trust [66] - 9:12, 9:15, 11:15, 17:10, 17:21, 17:24, 18:12, 18:18, 18:22, 19:8, 19:11, 21:17, 21:19, 21:20, 21:23, 22:1, 22:21, 22:25, 29:2, 30:10, 39:2, 39:7, 39:11, 40:2, 40:21, 41:1, 41:6, 48:7, 48:11, 48:25, 49:6, 49:9, 49:10, 49:11, 49:13, 50:3, 50:8, 50:10, 50:19, 51:3, 51:10, 51:11, 51:13, 51:15, 52:16, 52:20, 53:7, 56:4, 56:19, 57:1, 60:3, 67:16, 75:2, 75:19, 75:24 Trust/Mulligan [1] -26:9 trustee [10] - 11:13, 11:18, 17:23, 38:1, 38:20, 39:2, 41:6, 44:15, 75:19, 81:7 trustees [9] - 15:6, 17:20, 18:13, 19:9, 28:5, 28:17, 28:18, 30:3, 39:19 trustors [3] - 18:14, 39:19, 39:20 trusts [1] - 30:21 truth [2] - 14:3, 35:18 try [1] - 31:21 trying [3] - 7:12, 62:6, 65:21 turn [10] - 14:21, 16:25, 18:7, 19:20, 21:2, 23:7, 26:1, 27:24, 28:13, 47:9 two [13] - 9:14, 10:5, 30:6, 30:16, 30:21, 36:10, 56:14, 56:25,

30:11, 30:16, 36:10, 48:12, 48:22, 48:23, 49:15, 49:16, 49:22,

65:18, 66:20, 71:4, 80:2 type [1] - 33:23

U

ultimately [3] - 10:20, 11:1, 59:17 Ultimately [2] - 33:24 Under [3] - 48:25, 49:1, 49:2 under [30] - 7:7, 8:23, 9:21, 10:10, 11:6, 13:19, 18:20, 20:9, 38:19, 40:25, 41:5, 41:18, 41:22, 41:24, 45:17, 53:14, 54:7, 56:10, 57:10, 57:17, 57:23, 58:7, 59:5, 59:7, 59:10, 59:21, 63:18, 64:9, 65:7, 66:6 underlying [1] - 10:14 undermine [1] - 74:22 Understood [1] -80:22 underwriter [1] - 32:9 underwriting [4] -32:13, 32:15, 32:16, 33:2 unilaterally [1] - 7:6 unique [4] - 10:4, 55:21, 57:20, 81:12 United [1] - 60:15 unjust [1] - 9:25 unless [2] - 62:22, 66:11 unnecessary [1] -80:13 unusual [1] - 12:17 up [15] - 7:14, 24:19, 31:12, 41:1, 42:18, 49:23, 53:2, 56:8, 59:19, 62:11, 64:5, 65:24, 72:19, 81:6, 81:9 upheld [3] - 61:20, 65:23, 65:24 urge [1] - 60:24 usual [1] - 12:16 Utah [14] - 10:3, 10:5, 34:5, 39:4, 40:4, 43:11, 57:19, 59:21, 63:7, 64:7, 81:3, 81:7, 81:14, 81:16

V

valid [5] - 27:8, 59:21, 72:1, 75:22, 76:10

validity [6] - 68:2, 68:10, 71:7, 74:6, 74:23 validly [2] - 12:19, 73:1 Valle [84] - 6:13, 9:11, 11:12, 11:13, 11:15, 11:17, 15:3, 15:5, 15:6, 17:8, 17:18, 17:20, 17:21, 17:25, 18:13, 19:9, 19:13, 19:25, 23:19, 24:20, 25:3, 25:11, 25:15, 26:8, 28:4, 28:5, 28:17, 28:18, 29:5, 29:8, 29:16, 29:17, 30:3, 37:25, 38:1, 38:15, 38:18, 38:20, 38:23, 39:10, 39:18, 40:2, 40:6, 40:22, 40:25, 41:5, 41:12, 41:19, 41:22, 41:24, 42:10, 44:11, 44:14, 44:18, 48:17, 48:21, 49:5, 49:9, 50:6, 50:7, 50:9, 56:21, 59:5, 59:8, 59:22, 65:5, 68:23, 70:20, 74:9, 74:12, 74:15, 74:25, 75:18, 75:23 value [4] - 76:14, 76:16, 76:18, 78:15 various [2] - 32:13, 81:4 venue [7] - 8:24, 63:18, 63:19, 64:12, 64:22, 70:2 verify [1] - 17:22 versus [6] - 4:5, 10:6, 54:18, 55:2, 57:25, 60:15 via [2] - 22:24, 32:25 vice [3] - 14:11, 31:7, 31:20 Vice [1] - 31:21 vis [1] - 32:25 vis-a-via [1] - 32:25 voided [1] - 77:25 volunteer [2] - 52:7, 56:15

W

wait [1] - 52:25 waited [3] - 52:19 waiting [2] - 13:9, 13:11 wants [3] - 47:19, 60:23, 75:7 warranty [3] - 28:3,

28:15, 28:16 Weber [10] - 9:1, 23:19, 25:6, 26:3, 26:25, 37:23, 62:9, 69:24, 72:10, 73:13 website [1] - 26:14 weighs [1] - 58:2 weight [4] - 26:21, 35:17, 35:23, 36:18 welcome [1] - 47:21 whatsoever [1] -63:15 whole [1] - 69:17 wife [2] - 9:15, 15:5 wife's [1] - 49:2 windfall [3] - 52:1, 53:4, 57:2 wish [2] - 4:25, 13:4 withdraw [3] - 77:18, 78:9, 78:13 withdrawal [2] -77:19, 77:20 withdrawing [1] -77:21 withdrawn [2] - 78:6, 78:7 withdrew [3] - 62:19, 62:20, 65:12 witness [20] - 4:21, 13:23, 14:2, 31:1, 34:17, 34:23, 35:1, 35:16, 35:21, 36:1, 40:11, 43:22, 46:13, 46:15, 46:19, 47:17, 48:5, 48:10, 50:4 Witness [1] - 13:20 WITNESS [6] - 13:22, 17:6, 39:16, 40:17, 43:15, 46:12 witness' [3] - 26:18, 40:14, 46:10 witnesses [2] - 34:22, 35:14 wonder [1] - 18:19 words [2] - 50:4, 54:4 wore [1] - 32:12 writ [83] - 5:23, 5:24, 7:7, 7:16, 8:3, 8:5, 8:6, 8:15, 8:18, 9:8, 10:24, 11:1, 11:3, 11:7, 11:9, 11:16, 12:19, 46:23, 50:25, 51:6, 52:22, 52:23, 53:23, 53:24, 54:1, 54:8, 57:15, 58:21, 58:23, 59:2, 59:3, 59:15, 59:16, 59:20, 60:1, 60:5, 61:2,

61:11, 61:18, 62:7,

62:10, 63:6, 63:7,

63:9, 63:11, 63:13, 63:14, 64:9, 64:14, 64:21, 65:3, 65:23, 66:9, 66:21, 66:25, 67:2, 67:15, 67:21, 67:22, 68:2, 68:3, 68:11, 69:14, 69:19, 69:24, 71:8, 71:25, 72:20, 72:21, 72:22, 72:25, 73:2, 74:5, 74:21, 74:23, 74:25, 75:12, 77:8, 79:1, 80:9 writ." [1] - 67:25 write [1] - 65:7 writing [1] - 7:19 written [5] - 6:4, 6:23,

Y

7:1, 7:3, 8:12

year[1] - 33:25 years [4] - 31:6, 31:23, 59:13, 81:8

Z

zero [1] - 50:14 Zion's [1] - 49:21

"But [1] - 8:6 "Comity [1] - 60:18 "During [2] - 39:6, 60:2 "Federal [1] - 12:9 "Indeed [1] - 64:17 "May [1] - 6:1 "Neither [1] - 68:17 "Real [1] - 10:4 "shall [1] - 63:20 "Simply [1] - 64:20 "The [3] - 59:2, 59:3, 69:18 "Therefore [1] - 6:12 "this [1] - 64:20 "Those [1] - 70:7 "We [4] - 67:10, 67:14, 67:23, 70:1 "Well [1] - 73:13 "when [1] - 18:20